

6 DECEMBER 1946

I N D E X
Of
WITNESSES

Prosecution's Witnesses

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| de Weerd, Klaas A., Major, Artillery, Royal Netherlands Indies Army | 12125 |
| Direct by Mr. Hyde | 12125 |
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I N D E X
Of
EXHIBITS

| <u>Doc. No.</u> | <u>Pros. No.</u> | <u>Def. No.</u> | <u>Description</u> | <u>For Ident.</u> | <u>In Evidence</u> |
|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---|-----------------------|------------------------|
| 2750 | 1351 | | A Sworn Statement by Klaas A. de Weerd, Major, Artillery, Royal Netherlands Indies Army | | 12129 |
| 2756 | 1352 | | Notification Regarding Measures Ensuing from the Proclamation of Admission of the Independ- ence of the East Indies, dated September, 1944 | | 12215 |
| 2757 | 1353 | | Basic Outline of Propaganda and Enlightenment Attendant on the Proclamation re Recognition of the Independ- ence of the East Indies, dated 7 September 1944 /SHOWA 19/ | | 12221 |

1
2 Friday, 6 December, 1946

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5 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
6 FOR THE FAR EAST
7 Court House of the Tribunal
8 War Ministry Building
9 Tokyo, Japan

10 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
11 at 0930.

12 - - -

13 Appearances:

14 For the Tribunal, same as before.

15 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

16 For the Defense Section, same as before.

17 The Accused:

18 All present except OKAWA, Shumei, who is
19 represented by his counsel.

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21 (English to Japanese and Japanese
22 to English interpretation was made by the
23 Language Section, IMTFE.)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hyde.

4 MR. HYDE: Mr. President and Members of the
5 Tribunal, I wish to call Klaas A. de Weerd to the
6 witness box.

7 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: Mr. President, if it
8 please the Tribunal, preparatory to swearing the wit-
9 ness I wish to announce that First Lieutenant J. T.
10 Cremer and Captain G. J. Jongejans have been sworn as
11 Dutch language interpreters.
12

13 - - -

14 K L A A S A. D E W E E R D, called as a witness on
15 behalf of the prosecution, being first duly sworn,
16 testified through Dutch interpreters as follows:

17 DIRECT EXAMINATION.

18 BY MR. HYDE:

19 Q Will you state your name, please?

20 A Klaas A. de Weerd.

21 Q I hand you prosecution document No. 2750.

22 Is that a statement prepared by you?

23 A Yes.

24 Q Is it true?

25 A Yes.

MR. HYDE: I offer prosecution document No.

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1 2750 in evidence.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Are those lights intended
3 to be on?

4 THE MONITOR: Yes, your Honor. We are having
5 a Dutch-Japanese interpreter to come to the witness
6 stand.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

8 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, when this
9 statement was presented to the Tribunal in Chambers
10 the defense entered numerous objections to it. I
11 shall not repeat those objections at this time but we
12 ask that they be considered as made again and renewed
13 for the purpose of our record.

14 THE PRESIDENT: The objections were to the
15 statement containing his opinions and conclusions, which
16 were for the Court to form.

17 MR. LOGAN: That is right.

18 THE PRESIDENT: I do not recollect any others,
19 Mr. Logan, but briefly re-state your objections.

20 MR. LOGAN: In addition to those, your Honor,
21 we also objected on the ground that the statement con-
22 tained a mass of detail which had no proper place in
23 this case.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Irrelevant and immaterial
25 matters. You need not state them, Mr. Logan.

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1 MR. LOGAN: And we also objected to it, your
2 Honor, on the ground that the method of presenting the
3 case by means of a statement which has been carefully
4 prepared by this witness and the prosecution was
5 inimical to the best interests of the accused in this
6 case, which we believe far outweighs the advantage that
7 the defense have by having this document about a week
8 before this witness appeared on the stand.

9 In addition to all this, your Honor, we wish
10 to present further objections at this time. This
11 statement, in the main, contains a history of political
12 acts which occurred in the Netherlands East Indies after
13 December 8th, 1941. As a matter of law, those should
14 not be permitted to be introduced in this case because
15 up to the present time the prosecution has failed to
16 present any evidence showing that any overt act was com-
17 mitted by Japan prior to December 8th, 1941, at which
18 time the evidence shows that the Netherlands East Indies
19 declared war on Japan. It is quite apparent from this
20 that there was no aggressive war; and furthermore, that
21 even with respect to the counts in the Indictment under
22 which this section is proceeding, counts 1, 4 and 5,
23 which refer to a conspiracy charge, that there can be
24 no claim of conspiracy if there was no war of aggression.
25

1 THE PRESIDENT: That by no means follows, Mr.
2 Logan. Conspiracy consists of a mere agreement.
3 We will not debate that now.

4 MR. LOGAN: Except, your Honor, that the heart
5 of that conspiracy charge is that the object of it was
6 to conduct an aggressive war.

7 THE PRESIDENT: As of the date of the agreement
8 the object was clear, and it was not cancelled by the
9 Dutch formal declaration of war. We will not debate
10 it now. You can debate this later, Mr. Logan.

11 MR. LOGAN: I just want to point out further,
12 your Honor, that with respect to counts 14 and 32,
13 the charges of aggressive war, this statement certainly
14 is not material with respect to those counts.

15 And furthermore, your Honor, we object to this
16 statement on the ground that the political acts com-
17 plained of in here are no different than those which
18 any conquering nation imposes on a vanquished nation,
19 such as is being imposed upon the conquered nations to-day.

20 THE PRESIDENT: The objections are overruled
21 without prejudice to the right of the defense to repeat
22 them as submissions in the course of their summing up.

23 Mr. Hyde.

24 MR. HYDE: Mr. President, I don't believe you
25 have ruled on my tender of this document in evidence.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: It is admitted on the usual
2 terms.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
4 No. 2750 will receive exhibit No. 1351.

5 (Whereupon, the document above re-
6 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
7 No. 1351 and received in evidence.)
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1 MR. HYDE: I will read exhibit No. 1351:

2 "I

3 "PERSONAL HISTORY

4 "My name is Klass A. de Weerd. I am a
5 Major in the Artillery of the reserve of the Royal
6 Netherlands Indies Army.

7 "I was born in Roermond, Limburg, the
8 Netherlands, on 6 April 1904. I am of Netherlands
9 nationality.

10 "After having studied law at the University
11 of Leiden (the Netherlands) I entered a lawyers'
12 office at Sourabaya (Java) on 28 August 1929 and
13 practised in the Law Courts of East-Java, Bali and
14 the South East of Borneo until the middle of 1937.

15 "In 1938, after having been on leave in
16 the Netherlands, I was employed for nearly a year
17 in the Labour Office (Labour Legislation Section)
18 of the Department of Justice of the Netherlands
19 Indies Government at Batavia. From the beginning
20 of 1939 I entered into partnership in a lawyers'
21 office at Medan (Sumatra).

22 "On the 12th of December 1941 I was
23 mobilized as an officer of the reserve of the
24 Royal Netherlands Indies Army and served as such
25 with the Staff of the First Division in West-Java. "

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1 "After the capitulation of the Royal
2 Netherlands Indies Army, I became a prisoner of
3 war of the Japanese and was confined in several
4 camps in West-Java until the middle of September
5 1945. From the beginning of this period I acted
6 as Camp translator of the Java newspapers in the
7 Malay language. The Japanese camp authorities
8 allowed Malay language newspapers to be brought
9 into the camps until the end of January 1944.

10 "As the situation in the islands inter-
11 ested me in particular I spent much time in
12 translating these items extensively into Dutch
13 and, together with several friends, I indexed
14 these data according to personalities and to
15 subjects.

16 "Our intention was to prepare several
17 studies concerning the Japanese occupation,
18 treating subjects such as Administration Propa-
19 ganda, Civil Affairs, Central Government, Labour,
20 Policy, etc. as well as to gather personal data
21 about Japanese authorities.

22 "II

23 "I had already prepared notes for several
24 of these studies when it became increasingly
25 difficult to keep this work secret from the

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1 Japanese guards. As in January 1944 it became
2 clear that we would shortly be moved to another
3 camp we soldered copies of our compilations and
4 indexes in tins and buried them in various places
5 in the camp grounds.

6 "From February 1944 until September 1945
7 I kept abreast of actual developments in the Neth-
8 erlands East Indies by reading Malay or (translated)
9 Japanese language newspapers occasionally smuggled
10 in, and by listening-in secretly to the Japanese
11 local broadcasts in Malay. During that period
12 I continually exchanged information and observa-
13 tions with new arrivals and through every other
14 channel available.

15 "After 15 August 1945 I once more regu-
16 larly received Malay newspapers and in the beginning
17 of September 1945 I recovered one complete copy of
18 my compilations and indexes from their hiding
19 place. In the middle of the same month I was
20 released from the prison camp and was assigned
21 to the Political Section of the Chief Commanding
22 Officer of the N.I.C.A. (Netherlands Indies Civil
23 Administration), later called the Allied Military
24 Administration Civil Affairs Branch, for Java, in
25 order to complete my work of collecting data about

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1 the Japanese occupation. A special section with
2 a staff of twenty was created for this purpose
3 under my direction; this section became a
4 special branch of Netherlands Forces Intelligence
5 Service (Headquarters at Batavia) in January 1946.

6 "In close cooperation with the Japanese
7 Affairs Section of said N.L.F.I.S., with S.E.A.T.I.C.
8 (South East Asia Translators and Interpreters' Corps)
9 and other offices and bureaus I collected such data
10 regarding the Japanese occupation as were available.
11 These data were contained in, inter alia, the
12 practically complete newspapers and the complete
13 Official Gazette "Osamu Kan Po" of the 16th Army
14 in Java, and a fairly complete

15 "III

16 "set of the official gazettes of the other islands,
17 edited during the occupation period, further reports
18 and surveys by Japanese, Dutch, Indonesian and
19 other military and civilian authorities and private
20 persons, seized Japanese and Malay official and
21 non-official documents, interrogations of Japanese
22 and Indonesian authorities, etc.

23 "In May 1946 I joined the Office of the
24 Attorney General, Netherlands East Indies, with the
25 special task of collecting such documents as would

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1 be needed for the preparation of the prosecution
2 of suspected Japanese Major War Criminals before the
3 International Military Tribunal at Tokyo and in this
4 capacity I continued my work of collecting data on
5 the Japanese occupation of the East Indies.

6 "In the middle of September 1946 I arrived
7 at Tokyo as a representative of the Attorney-General,
8 Netherlands East Indies, to continue my search for
9 further data here.

10 "From this collected information I have
11 prepared the attached report, entitled: "The Jap-
12 anese occupation of the Netherlands Indies."

13 I turn to page marked 2, passing over the
14 cover page.

15 "THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

16 "INTRODUCTION

17 "The Japanese occupation of the Netherlands
18 East Indies for convenience has been chronologically
19 divided into five phases,
20

21 "I. The period from March to August 1942,
22 which can be designated the transition
23 period.

24 "II. The second phase, which is characterized
25 by the consolidation of Japanese rule,
lasting from August 1942 to July 1943."

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1 "III. The period from July 1943 to
2 September 1944, which is governed
3 by an attempt at winning over the
4 population by promises.

5 "IV. The period from September 1944
6 to the beginning of August 1945,
7 involving further development
8 of the policy of promises.

9 "V. The period from the beginning of
10 August 1945 to the end of September
11 1945, involving at the last moment
12 an attempt to create a state,
13 friendly to Japan, in the South.

14 "The phases mentioned above have been more
15 and less arbitrarily divided into periods and conse-
16 quently these limits must be treated as being approxi-
17 mate. Occasionally for a better understanding a
18 certain subject has been exhaustively treated in one
19 of the phases, even if the events in question extended
20 beyond a particular phase.

21 "Japan's policy in regard to the Southern
22 Regions was broadly laid down in Tokyo for all regions
23 alike, so that only insignificant local modifications
24 were made, and then solely in the application and
25 not in the principle itself. Therefore, what happened

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1 in Java is treated as basic and mention will only
2 be made of modifications in other regions of the
3 Netherlands Indies which reveal important deviations
4 from events in Java."

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1 "I. THE TRANSITION PHASE

2 "Beginning of 1942 to approximately August
3 1942.4 "Throughout the East Indies, the entire
5 Occidental group of influential persons in the adminis-
6 tration and in commerce, industry etc., was immediately
7 and systematically interned in prisons and camps
8 hastily prepared for that purpose.9 "Exceptions were provisionally made in the
10 case of those Occidentals, who could not as yet be
11 replaced by Japanese. As soon as the Japanese replacing
12 them arrived, this group was also interned. A small
13 remaining group of workers was also confined in separate
14 camps, and their contact with the outer world was as
15 much as possible restricted.16 "In addition a large group of prominent Chinese,
17 mainly on the ground of their past support of the
18 Chinag Kai-shek regime, and on suspicion of their anti-
19 Japanese attitude, was interned.20 "The policy of internment became stricter
21 in the course of time and from July 1942 these measures
22 were, moreover, gradually applied to Occidental women.23 "By the end of 1943 the position had become
24 more or less stable, so that it may be said that all
25 Occidentals not born in the Netherlands Indies, both

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1 male and female, had been interned, with a few local
2 exceptions in the case of men and women above 65 or
3 70 years of age. Moreover, all Occidentals born
4 in the Netherlands Indies who still showed apparent
5 affinity with the Occidental world were interned, and
6 those Asiatics, too, who were 'suspected' of having
7 Occidental sympathies were confined in camps. According
8 to official Japanese returns as of 1 September 1945,
9 62,532 persons (i.e. 20,676 males, 28,169 females and
10 approximately 13,687 children) were interned in Java.
11 Besides, all Occidental military personnel were made
12 prisoners of war; this involved 45,000 men who, with the
13 exception of 6,107 men were drafted from Java for slave
14 labour elsewhere.

15 "Of the former Western community, only three
16 groups were still 'free'; namely, the group of Axis
17 subjects (who were not interned until after the defeat
18 of their fatherland), few neutrals and a category of
19 non-interned Eurasians. These groups were rigidly
20 spied upon, and prevented from the exercise of their
21 'freedom' in many other ways.

22 "This non-interned Occidental community was
23 subjected to very heavy pressure. Besides being spied
24 upon by the Japanese Military Police (Kempei) and its
25 henchmen, they were intimidated by continuous wholesale

1 arrests and trials involving hundreds of victims, and
2 by the fact that interrogation by the Kempei as well
3 as the treatment accorded by Japanese Courts Martial
4 were such that the victims were deprived of all rights,
5 and abandoned to arbitrary maltreatment and starvation
6 methods.

7 "Occidentals were, whenever possible, dis-
8 missed from their official and private positions
9 and appointments, thus depriving the greater part
10 of this section of the community of its means of
11 livelihood. All bank balances were immediately frozen,
12 Occidental banks were liquidated, and the percentage
13 payable in respect of liquidation was withheld from
14 Occidentals. The few non-interned Occidentals were
15 faced with practically no alternative than gradually
16 to sell all their possessions. They were further
17 handicapped by the fact that the Japanese requisitioned
18 whatever took their fancy, generally without payment
19 of any compensation. By introducing compulsory registra-
20 tion and the payment of registration fees - (150
21 guilders for Europeans; 75 guilders for Chinese and
22 other non-Indonesian Asiatics) - the Japanese military
23 authorities made the position still more difficult for
24 these communities.
25

"Along with this, the use of Western languages

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1 was soon forbidden in public and business communications,
2 and in certain places the speaking of Western languages
3 was prohibited even within the home. Those who spoke
4 a Western language at home, were suspected by the
5 Kempei, and subjected to methods employed by that
6 organization.

7 "At the same time, the Japanese immediately
8 began to close down all schools. During the second
9 period Occidental schools and education remained
10 definitely banned.

11 "In April 1942 a ban on listening-in to radio
12 broadcasts from outside the East Indies was promulgated.
13 This prohibition was enforced by compulsory sealing
14 and registration of all wireless sets, to make them
15 unsuitable for the reception of short-wave broadcasts
16 from abroad. In July 1942, sentences were pronounced
17 and published by the Japanese Court Martial, that persons
18 who had listened-in to foreign broadcasts despite
19 the ban and/or had spread news therefrom, were, inter
20 alia, sentenced to death.

21 "Throughout Japanese occupation, persons
22 suspected of having failed to comply with this
23 prohibition were regularly seized by the Kempei,
24 tortured and sometimes tried.
25

"The possession of certain numerous specified

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1 books in enemy languages constituted a punishable
2 offence. Such books had to be handed over and were
3 burnt.

4 "Old monuments, - reminders of former
5 Occidental influence were carried away, partly
6 destroyed, or otherwise stored in warehouses.

7 "In most places, the names of streets
8 and towns were changed into Japanese, or sometimes
9 Malay.

10 "Names of shops, commercial concerns,
11 trademarks, etc., could no longer appear in Western
12 languages, but had to be transcribed into Japanese
13 or Malay.

14 "Since the Kempeitai-methods were practised
15 not only on the Occidental community, but also upon
16 members of the other communities, all expression of
17 democratic or pro-Occidental sympathies was silenced.

18 "All existing Councils wherein, hitherto,
19 the opinion of various communities could be freely
20 expressed on problems of administration were abolished

21 "The first to be dissolved was the
22 Peoples' Council, established in 1918, which exercised
23 legislative and budgetary functions.

24 "Next, in Java, the Provincial, Municipal
25 and Regency Councils, which similarly had legislative

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1 "and budgetary powers, were abolished.

2 "In regions outside Java, too, the
3 various councils which had been established on a
4 democratic basis to give the people an opportunity
5 of participation in the administration of their
6 country, were liquidated.

7 "By Ordinance No. 14 of the Japanese Commander-

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1 in-Chief, Java, dated 29 April 1942, all existing law
2 courts were abolished, and in their stead 'apanese
3 'Law Courts of the Military Government' (Gunsei Hooiin)
4 were established. This new judiciary was provisional
5 and was later replaced by a definitive organization.

6 "There was no provision for appeals. The
7 decisions in all pending cases of the lower courts
8 were declared to be deemed to have been affirmed by
9 the Appellate Court.

10 "By Ordinances Nos. 2 and 3 of the Japanese
11 Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 and 20 March 1942
12 respectively, all meetings, associations etc. were
13 forbidden. By Ordinance No. 23 of 15 July 1942 this
14 prohibition was not only explicitly maintained, but
15 also all chairmen were ordered to dissolve their
16 respective associations.

17 "The only associations excepted were those
18 concerned with sports and recreation, and scientific,
19 cultural, charitable and distributing organizations.

20 "Even associations not prohibited were restricted
21 in their activities; they were subjected to police
22 supervision, and could only resume their activities
23 after obtaining permission from the police, and
24 registration. Meetings had to be authorized by the
25 police."

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1 "In practice, activities were permitted only
2 those associations, which accepted Japanese leadership
3 and which could be used for propaganda purposes, as,
4 e.g., the Ikatan Sport Indonesia (I.S.I., Indonesian
5 Sport League).

6 "From the outset, the Japanese authorities
7 built up a very extensive propaganda machine.

8 "Along with the first troops to land on Java,
9 came the vanguard.

10 "These Japanese propagandist, organized in
11 the Propaganda Section ('Barisan Propaganda') of the
12 Japanese 16th Army (Osamu Butai), tried to establish
13 immediate contact with Indonesian and Chinese
14 politicians, known to be disaffected. With the
15 assistance of these dissatisfied persons, in April
16 1942 the so-called 'Tiga A' movement was established.
17 Local committees of Indonesians were set up to carry
18 on the activities of this movement; but such commit-
19 tees had no function other than to carry out activ-
20 ities planned by the local Japanese propagandists.

21 "These propagandists immediately seized
22 control of all means of public expression. All public
23 and private radio broadcasts and cinematographic
24 activities as well as the entire Press were immediately
25 placed under their control. For about two months after

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1 the occupation, these broadcasts and newspapers
2 were still permitted to be transmitted and to
3 appear in Dutch. As soon as the propaganda machine
4 had been sufficiently organized, all newspapers
5 were forbidden, and in their stead new papers were
6 introduced in the Malay language under the direction
7 of Indonesian and Chinese pressmen carefully chosen
8 by the Japanese propaganda service. On the Emperor's
9 birthday (29th April 1942), the first new Malay
10 language daily paper in Java, the 'Asia Raya'
11 (Greater Asia) was established, and continued to
12 appear regularly until 9 September 1945, as the
13 most important organ for voicing Japanese propaganda.
14 At first it was under Japanese direction; but after
15 the Indonesian staff had proved themselves 'matured'
16 the direction was officially handed over to them;
17 but in reality, the direction remained in Japanese
18 hands.

19 "Other places in Java soon followed suit,
20 so that ultimately Japanese controlled newspapers
21 in Malay were issued in five places in Java.

22 "In addition a Japanese language paper,
23 the Java Shimbun, was published in Batavia.

24 "In her propaganda Japan referred to herself
25 as the 'liberator', come to establish a 'New Order.' "

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1 "It stated, that 'New-Java' was to be educated to
2 become a worthy member of the Greater East Asia
3 Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan.

4 "The Japanese instituted a rigid censor-
5 ship, which not only affected all postal, telegraphic
6 and telephonic communication, but also extended to
7 all photographs given to professional photographers
8 for development.

9 Furthermore, all public utterances were
10 subject to censorship. This did not alone extend
11 to all radio broadcasts and the press, but also to
12 the theater, sermons, etc. Gradually theatrical
13 companies, etc. were taken over by the propaganda
14 service.

15 "The publication of books was also subject
16 to censorship, and only works emanating from the
17 propaganda service appeared during the period of
18 occupation. By these methods the Japanese had con-
19 trol of all expressions of public opinion.

20 "During the period now being treated
21 Japanization of the Southern Regions was begun.
22 For instance, the use of Japanese words was immedi-
23 ately introduced for designating official services,
24 offices, etc. and this usage gradually became preva-
25 lent during the occupation, so that ultimately the

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1 reading of a Malay language newspaper was scarcely
2 possible without knowledge of the offices, services,
3 institutions, organizations, ideas, etc., referred
4 to by Japanese words."
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1 "The Japanese authorities introduced the
2 Japanese system of dating years, the Japanese time
3 system and the Japanese budgetary year.

4 "The police wore the Japanese flag for cap
5 badges. Emperor worship -- offensive to Mohammedans --
6 was introduced. All public gatherings and meetings
7 began with the obligatory bow in the direction of
8 the Tokyo palace. Most meetings ended with the
9 words: 'Tenno Heika -- banzai.' All Japanese days
10 of celebration were introduced. The display of any
11 flag other than the Japanese was forbidden. On the
12 Japanese days of celebration the Japanese flag had
13 to be flown on all official and private buildings
14 under strictly prescribed rules.

15 "Portraits of members of the Dutch and
16 Allied Governments were forbidden. These had to
17 be handed over and were burned.

18 "The possession of portraits and other
19 pictures of the Japanese Imperial family was governed
20 by rules aimed at ensuring that there should be no
21 'lese-majesty'.

22 "Postage and revenue stamps were marked
23 'Dai Nippon,' and later new stamps were issued with
24 texts in Malay and Japanese reading 'Dai Nippon.'

25 "The Japanese at once began to establish

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1 schools which taught only the Japanese language.
2 When later schools for Indonesians were reopened
3 the curriculum was revised to meet Japanese re-
4 quirements and important subjects in the new
5 schedule were Japanese language and Japanese songs
6 and dances, etc.

7 "In the fields of finance and economics
8 the programs applied in the East Indies were similar
9 despite the fact that some areas were administered
10 by the Army, and some by the Navy.

11 "Java and Sumatra were occupied by differ-
12 ent Japanese armies and Celebes, Borneo, the Moluc-
13 cas, Timor, etc., were occupied by the Japanese
14 Navy, with practically no contact with each other.
15 Nevertheless the basic principles upon which these
16 regions were administered were entirely similar in
17 reality.

18 "The first ordinance of the Japanese
19 Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 7 March 1942, No. 1,
20 introduced Japanese military paper currency with the
21 text in Dutch, reading: 'The Japanese Government.
22 One half guilder.' Paper money was issued similarly
23 in other denominations. The East Indies guilder was
24 reduced to the value of the yen. At first, the paper
25 money already in circulation was retained; but later,

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1 when this old currency had considerably greater value
2 in the open market than the Japanese occupation
3 money, it was withdrawn and its possession consti-
4 tuted a punishable offense. The Japanese paper money
5 revealed differences in the various occupied areas.
6 In Sumatra, which was originally under the same
7 military administration as Malaya, the same text
8 appeared on the same background as in the case of
9 the paper money issued in Java, but in English,
10 whereas in the other regions of the East Indies,
11 and in Portuguese Timor, the Dutch text was used.

12 "In 1944, new paper money was designed
13 and printed in Batavia, with the text in Japanese
14 and Malay.

15 "This paper money was issued in unlimited
16 quantities without backing, which soon led to in-
17 flation, which began early in 1943 and continued to
18 increase at an ever faster rate, until by the middle
19 of 1945 this paper money only had about a fortieth
20 of its original purchasing value.

21 "All banks, both official and non-official,
22 were closed down at once. During the course of 1942
23 and 1943 the Java Bank (the circulation bank) and
24 private banks were liquidated. The Post Office
25 Savings Bank and the Peoples' General Credit Bank

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1 which largely had Indonesian clients, were reopened
2 under Japanese names and under Japanese direction,
3 but the balances due at the time of the closing
4 remained frozen. Later, the cash deposits of
5 Indonesian clients were partly unfrozen while the
6 deposits of Occidentals and internees and prisoners
7 remained frozen, and were transferred to the
8 Japanese established Enemy Property Administration
9 Bureau (Tekisan Kanribu), which was charged with
10 the 'custody' of enemy property. This institution
11 liquidated nearly all confiscated property, and
12 credited in its books the owners thereof, when
13 known, with the proceeds in Japanese paper money.

14 "Later, after May 1945, this liquidation
15 was hastened. In Batavia the Kempei and its
16 members were frequently the purchasers at so-called
17 public auctions, and the proceeds in Japanese
18 occupation money bore no reasonable relation to the
19 real price for the same article in the same paper
20 money in the open market.

21 "All stocks of Occidental importers, as
22 well as private possessions in the form of movables
23 and claims for payment (when capable of realization)
24 owned by Occidentals were translated into claims in
25 Japanese paper money on the above-named Tekisan

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1 Kanribu. Possession of 'enemy property' consti-
2 tuted a punishable offense and the holder was
3 obliged to hand it over. Even non-interned
4 Eurasians were considered enemy nationals, so that
5 rents, due them, had to be paid to the Japanese.
6 Unsold property was delivered upon request to Japan-
7 ese officials and individuals, and their proteges.

8 "Before the war, in the Netherlands Indies,
9 big capital, chiefly contributed by Occidentals,
10 had been invested in agricultural enterprises and
11 industries. The agricultural enterprises (excepting
12 sugar-factories, which were organized in the 'Java
13 Togyo Rengo Kai') were brought by the Japanese under
14 the 'Saibai Kigyoo Kanrikoodan.' This organization
15 had charge of the administration of 'enemy' agri-
16 cultural concerns under the Tekisan Kanribu and the
17 control over all other agricultural enterprises
18 including those operated with Indonesian or
19 Chinese capital. Little attention was paid to the
20 interests of owners. This body executed a policy
21 directed towards carrying out a rigorous war effort
22 and to the maintenance of production required by the
23 Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Enterprises
24 and industries which were of no importance to the
25 immediate war effort, were whenever possible switched

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1 over to other production, or when that was not
2 feasible, were retained if such retention were
3 deemed worthwhile from the point of view of the
4 anticipated requirements of the Great East Asia Co-
5 Prosperity Sphere at the end of the war. Tea and
6 rubber plantations suffered seriously, because the
7 Japanese, during the later stages of the occupation,
8 gave precedence to food crops. Tea plants and rubber
9 trees were chopped and used for firewood, the estates
10 being parceled out amongst local farmers to increase
11 areas for food crops.

12 "A large part of the Western-owned agri-
13 cultural enterprises was liquidated. The entire
14 sugar industry was allotted in six or seven blocks
15 to the large Japanese sugar companies, and was
16 exploited by them under the continued direction and
17 control of the above-mentioned body.

18 "Sugar production was reduced considerably
19 and the machinery belonging to the unworked sugar
20 factories was partly scrapped or carried off, when
21 the factories were not switched over to produce
22 other commodities more important for the war effort,
23 such as alcohol, butanol, etc.

24 "The possession of immovable property belong-
25 ing to Occidentals or governmental institutions, was

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1 transferred by the Japanese to the 'Hudoosan
2 Kanrikoodan' established by them, which handed over
3 the property as required to the Japanese military
4 or civil authorities for business and for personal
5 purposes.

6 "Ownership of immovable property was
7 drastically changed by the Japanese.

8 "The so-called 'private estates' were
9 appropriated by the Military Government without the
10 payment of any compensation to the owners, under
11 Ordinance No. 17 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief,
12 Java, dated 1 June 1942.

13 "In the other islands too, such expropria-
14 tions took place, as for instance in the Celebes,
15 by virtue of an Ordinance No. 11 of the Minseifu
16 (the Civil Administration), dated 20 March 1943.

17 "Public utilities, including those privately
18 owned, were seized by the Military Administration and
19 were operated without compensation, and in some cases
20 were allotted to private Japanese companies.

21 "Private railway, tramway and bus companies
22 were amalgamated with the State Railways. The equip-
23 ment of private railway companies was for a large
24 part shipped to the Burma-Siam railway. Direction
25 of railways was unified under the Rikuyu Sookyoku

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1 (Railway Head Office), and all trace of former
2 independent operation by private companies was
3 obliterated. The personnel of these companies was
4 pooled and Japanese rank designations and termin-
5 ology were introduced.

6 "Private or semi-governmental gas and
7 power companies as well as privately owned mining
8 concerns were taken over and operated by either the
9 Military Government or Japanese companies.

10 "The policy of exploitation of natural
11 resources of the East Indies was carried on partly
12 by the Military Administration itself, partly
13 through monopolies granted to certain big Japanese
14 business concerns and partly by Japanese 'national
15 policy companies.'

16 "The Southern Development Bank (Nanpoo
17 Kaihatu Ginko), an entirely government-owned and
18 operated bank had as its chief function the financing
19 of the development and exploitation of natural re-
20 sources in the Southern Regions and the control of
21 circulation and finance in those areas. This bank
22 was directed by the Ministry for Greater East Asia
23 and it acted in the Southern Regions as cashier to
24 the Japanese Army.

25 "The Japanese Government also divided up

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1 natural resources in the Southern Regions between
2 the various Japanese applicants and allotted each
3 of them part of those areas, usually according
4 them monopolies.

5 "Domei was granted a news service monopoly
6 although a local agency had started first.

7 "Press monopolies in the Southern Regions
8 were divided among various big Japanese newspaper
9 concerns.

10 "In the field of banking, the Yokohama
11 Specie Bank and the Taiwan Bank were chartered to
12 operate in Java, and took over the functions of
13 private Occidental banks.

14 "The liquidation of these banks and the
15 introduction of Japanese banks was effected, inter
16 alia, by compelling the bank debtors whose debts
17 were declared to be claimable on 25th November
18 1942 to apply to the Japanese banks for new credits
19 backed by the securities pledged to the Western banks.

20 "THE SECOND PHASE

21 "August 1942 to July 1943.

22 "During the period just discussed the
23 Japanese administrative machinery was relatively
24 simple. The Chief of Staff to the Japanese Commander-
25 in-Chief of Java was concurrently Chief of the

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1 Military Government (Gunseikan) and was assisted
2 by a simple 'central organ' and by three Army
3 officers each administering his respective area
4 in East, West and Central Java. Administration was
5 carried on locally by Commanding Officers of occu-
6 pational detachments.

7 "Original plans drawn up in Tokyo, envis-
8 aged sending out parties consisting of Japanese
9 experts in colonial administration, technical
10 sciences, and economy, immediately following the
11 occupational troops. It was not, however, until
12 the beginning of August 1942 that the provisional
13 set-up was succeeded by a regular Administration.

14 "The Military Government, which at first
15 was part and parcel of the Army, was next developed
16 into a separate body.

17 "The gist of its functions was laid down
18 in Ordinance No. 1 of the Japanese Commander-in-
19 Chief, dated 7 March 1942, in which he assumed all
20 powers which hitherto had been exercised by the
21 Governor-General. The military administration
22 (Gunsei) was divided into nine departments under
23 the supervision of the Gunseikan. The departments
24 were Soomubu (General Affairs), the guiding and
25 policy making body; Maimubu (Internal Affairs);

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1 Zaimubu (Finance); Sihoobu (Justice), Keimubu
2 (Police); Kootubu (Public Works); Sangyobu
3 (Economic Affairs); Kaikai Kantokubu (Audition);
4 and Sendonbu (Propaganda).

5 "In addition from time to time a number
6 of Bureaus, and other governmental bodies, without
7 the standing of the Departments but under the
8 Gunseikan and equally independent, were created to
9 handle various matters, such as the Syuumubu (Re-
10 ligious Affairs Bureau), the Zoosen Kyoku (Ship-
11 building Bureau), the Tekisan Kanribu (Enemy
12 Property Bureau); the Toogyoo Rengoo Kai (Sugar
13 Producers' Corporation) etc. From time to time
14 some changes were made, which did not affect the
15 system. "
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1 "The structure of the pre-war Central Ad-
2 ministration was changed thoroughly and in its en-
3 tirety. Neither a General Affairs Department nor a
4 Propaganda Department had formerly existed. Police
5 were under the Internal Affairs Department, while
6 Public Health, Education and Labour (now under
7 Maimubu) were handled by separate Departments or
8 Bureaus in the pre-war establishment. Religious
9 Affairs had been handled by the Education and
10 Religion Department.

11 "The Government Secretariate, the Council
12 of State for the Indies and the Governor-General's
13 Cabinet disappeared altogether. The former Depart-
14 ments of general administration, corresponding in
15 name with the new Japanese Departments (e. g. Justice
16 Department) were reorganized along Japanese lines.

17 "All leading positions in the Departments
18 were occupied by Japanese. According to official
19 Japanese information, on 1 September 1945, 23,242
20 Japanese nationals were employed by the Military
21 Government in Java, amounting to half the number
22 of service personnel proper stationed there.

23 "Legislative powers were exercised by the
24 Imperial Government at Tokyo, the Supreme Commander
25 in the Southern Area, the Commander-in-Chief of Java,

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1 and the Chief of Military Administration (Gunseikan).
2 The laws and ordinances of the first two bodies were
3 not published locally, although thousands were ar-
4 rested, tortured and sentenced under them, while
5 those of the ~~two last~~ mentioned organs were pub-
6 lished in Java, in the Osamu Kan Po, the official
7 bi-monthly Gazette, printed in Japanese and Malay.
8 Some secret ordinances appeared only in the Japanese
9 edition.

10 "The institution of Advisory Councils at
11 a later stage did not affect the legislative position
12 in any way.

13 "Ordinance No. 27 issued by the Commander-
14 in-Chief, Java, dated 5 August 1942 laid down an
15 entirely new system of local administration. Under
16 this Java was divided into 17 'Syuu,' comparable
17 geographically to the former 'Residencies' and one
18 'Tokubatsu Si' ('Special City Area') comprising
19 Batavia. The four Sultanatos in Central Java were
20 administered by two 'Kooti Zimu Kyoku' (Sultanatos'
21 Bureaus).

22 "The former 'Provinces' of West, Central
23 and East Java were eliminated. In early 1945, the
24 Commander-in-Chief, Java, instituted three 'Gunseisibu,'
25 coinciding geographically with the former Provinces

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1 but entirely differing in kind, as the Commander-
2 in-Chief pointed out in an official statement.

3 "All these local bodies supplanted the
4 former decentralized and autonomous local adminis-
5 tration, and were placed directly under the Gunsei-
6 kanbu in a rigidly centralized system. Local coun-
7 cils were not mentioned in the Ordinance, and popular
8 participation in local administration came to an end.

9 "The Syuu were subdivided into smaller
10 units in accordance with the Japanese pattern. These
11 were given Japanese names such as Ken, Gun, Son, Ku,
12 Si and Siku. During this second period the organic
13 laws governing the functions of administrative bodies
14 under the old system were abolished, and replaced by
15 Japanese regulations, on which the centralized new
16 administration was based.

17 "The position of the Syuutyoo (comparable
18 to the former 'Resident') and of other local officials
19 was, on one hand, considerably strengthened, and on
20 the other made far more dependent on the Central
21 Administration. The Fuehrer-principle was introduced.
22 These officials, responsible only to their superiors,
23 had a large measure of liberty in the execution of
24 their duties: they had powers of dismissal and ap-
25 pointment, and almost unrestricted disciplinary powers

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over their staffs.

1 "They were empowered to issue regulations
2 to implement ordinances promulgated by higher au-
3 thority and also regulations concerning matters not
4 yet covered by such ordinances. However, they were
5 subject to the authority of their superiors and were
6 responsible to them in all cases. According to
7 statements by Japanese Syuutyoo and similar authori-
8 ties, the object the Japanese had in mind was to
9 build up an administration which in its final form
10 should be on the same lines as those followed in
11 their colonies in Formosa and Korea.
12

13 "The four ruling Sultans were maintained,
14 not as having hereditary title to their positions,
15 but as newly invested Rulers called 'Ko' owing
16 allegiance to the Japanese Army in the same way
17 as all civilian officials did.

18 "All key-positions in the new establishment
19 were occupied by Japanese. From the Gunseikan down
20 to the Syuu Office, the staff was almost entirely
21 Japanese. From the Ken Office downward, the Indo-
22 nesian staff was almost wholly maintained. The
23 Kentyoo, however, was, from 1944 onward, assisted by
24 Japanese advisors.

25 "The composition of the Administrative

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1 Corps was modified later pursuant to Prime Minister
2 TOJO's promises. However, leading positions remained
3 in the hands of Japanese and if an Indonesian held
4 an important post there was always a Japanese who was
5 the real executive.

6 "It was not until the end of August 1945
7 that Japanese officials handed over actual authority
8 to their Indonesian colleagues.

9 "According to the biographies of the Japanese
10 officials, published by the propaganda service, this
11 corps was assembled chiefly in colonial Formosa and
12 Korea, and some had been engaged in administrative
13 functions in Japan proper."
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1 "The establishment of a new administrative
2 system in islands other than Java developed along the
3 same lines.

4 "In the initial stage, Sumatra along with
5 Malaya formed an administrative unit under an Army
6 Commander at Singapore, but later Sumatra was placed
7 under a separate Gunseikanbu.

8 "The 16th and 25th Armies (Java and Sumatra
9 respectively) came under the 7th Area Army with Head-
10 quarters at Singapore, commanded in the final stages
11 by ITAGAKI, Seishiro. This 7th Area Army came under
12 the Southern Theater commanded by Field Marshal
13 TERAUCHI.

14 "The Military Administration operated pursuant
15 to both orders issued through the ordinary channels of
16 command and issued directly from the Ministry of War.

17 "In the Celebes, Borneo and all islands east
18 of a line running north and south through Bali and
19 Macassar Straits the Japanese Navy was in power. While
20 the terminology varied, the system was not substantially
21 different. The same principles of centralized adminis-
22 tration were applied and relations between Japanese and
23 Indonesian officials were the same.

24 "Administration in territory under Naval Occu-
25 pation (Minsei) was executed by the Minseihu (Headquarters)

1 at Macassar (Celebes).

2 "The Minseihu at Macassar was under the com-
3 mand of the Officer Commanding the Second Southern
4 Squadron, whose Headquarters was at Sourabaya. This
5 Headquarters fell under the Officer Commanding the 7th
6 Southern Squadron at Singapore.

7 "Parallel with reorganization of the Adminis-
8 tration, the Judicial System was entirely revised. In
9 addition to the Gunsei Hooiin (Courts of the Military
10 Administration), set up in the first period to replace
11 the former Courts, there were the Gun Kaigi, a Court
12 Martial proper, to try Japanese service personnel
13 and others subject to Court Martial, and the Gunritu
14 Kaigi, a Court Martial to try violations of the Army
15 Ordinances.

16 "The Gunsei Hooiin itself had jurisdiction to
17 try violations of Military Government Ordinances and
18 Regulations, and former Ordinances declared in force
19 by the Military Government. This jurisdiction was
20 shared with the Gunritu Kaigi.

21 "Ordinance No. 14, of the Commander-in-Chief,
22 Java, dated 26 September, 1942, gave the Gunsei Hooiin
23 their final form.

24 "Eight type of courts were set up, all bearing
25 Japanese names, and including the Saikoo Hooiin (Final

1 Court of Appeal) and the Kootoo Hooiin (Intermediary
2 Courts of Appeal), the personnel of both of which at
3 first was entirely Japanese. The lower courts com-
4 prised the Police Court, the District Court and other
5 local courts corresponding to the local administrative
6 subdivisions, and two special religious courts, all
7 manned by Indonesians and directly controlled by the
8 Intermediary Courts of Appeal.

9 "To each court a Kensatu-Kyoku (Prosecution
10 Section) was attached. This system was strongly cen-
11 tralized under the Justice Department. At a later
12 stage it was detached from the Justice Department,
13 and combined with the police force under the Police
14 Department which was renamed Public Security Department
15 (Tianbu).

16 "In criminal courts with Indonesian members
17 a representative of the Kempei attended the sessions,
18 seated next to the representative of the Kensatu-kyoku.

19 "In the initial stages the former Penal Code
20 was maintained. Having determined that this criminal
21 law was based on excessively democratic foundations the
22 Japanese introduced a new Penal Code in 1944, in which
23 criminal acts were defined in vague terms, leaving
24 wide scope for interpretation. High minima of punishment
25 were introduced for special offenses."

1 "During the Japanese occupation interference
2 by the Japanese Administration occurred frequently in
3 trials by Indonesian courts. In practice it was the
4 Kempei representative, attending criminal sessions,
5 who determined the sentence in criminal cases.

6 "During the session only Japanese and Malay
7 languages were allowed.

8 "Trials by the Courts Martial proper were
9 conducted in Japanese and proper interpretation was
10 seldom available.

11 "In the other islands of the East Indies
12 judicial powers were administered in the same manner.
13 Former courts were abolished and new Japanese courts
14 established.

15 "At the outset of the occupation the Japanese
16 authorities took over the Police School at Sukabumi,
17 Java. Also in the capitals of the various Syuu, per-
18 manent courses for the training of police personnel,
19 led by Japanese, were established. Finally propaganda
20 courses for personnel already in the service were con-
21 ducted regularly, in which the ideals of Greater East
22 Asia and Japan's might were taught. A system of cor-
23 poral maltreatment, administered on the spot or at the
24 police station, for the settlement of minor infractions
25 was introduced. Maltreatment as a punishment for

1 insignificant offenses was seen daily in the streets.
2 Acertain section of the Indonesian Police Force adopted
3 the tactics of the Kempei.

4 "A separate Police Department, later the
5 Public Security Department, was established along
6 centralized lines and all executive functions were
7 taken over by the Japanese.

8 "The existing Force was felt to be insufficient
9 by the Japanese authorities. Various ways to remedy
10 this situation were attempted.

11 "The Kempeihoo, an Indonesian extension of
12 the Kempei, trained by Kempei personnel in Kempei
13 methods, was organized. It was both feared and
14 hated by the people.

15 "In April 1943, a Keiboodan (a sort of Vil-
16 lage Guards) was organized as an auxiliary police
17 force in all villages and municipalities. This
18 reinforced the regular police by approximately
19 1,300,000."

20 THE PRESIDENT: This is a convenient break.
21 We will recess for fifteen minutes.

22 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
23 taken until 1100, after which the proceedings
24 were resumed as follows:)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hyde.

4 MR. HYDE: Mr. President, with the Tribunal's
5 permission, Mrs. Strooker will continue the reading
6 of exhibit 1350.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Mrs. Strooker.

8 MRS. STROOKER: I continue on page 21.

9 (Reading:)

10 "The Keiboodan had a variety of duties.
11 It had to go into action in case of fire or other
12 calamities, it had to assist the regular police in
13 apprehensions of crashed allied air crews, para-
14 troopers and others, did 24-hour guard duties in
15 its area, turned out in force during public propa-
16 ganda meetings etc. Its main duty consisted of
17 spying, chiefly in a general campaign against
18 enemy spies.

19 "In 1945, these Keiboodan were used to
20 train the population in guerilla action, such as
21 cutting lines of communication, destruction of
22 small enemy detachments, etc., with wholly inade-
23 quate weapons such as bamboo spears. This training
24 taught the simple farmer fear of foreigners and
25 hate for Occidentals and led to barbarous display

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1 of cruelty to these foreigners.

2 "A third force auxiliary to the police,
3 was set up early in 1945, and called Keibootai,
4 which operated only in towns and served the same
5 purpose as the Keiboodan. Its members were recruit-
6 ed chiefly from among the Chinese.

7 "The Kempei-Hoo was part of the Kempei.
8 Both the Keiboodan and the Keibootai although
9 Japanese-led, and trained, formed no part of the
10 official Army organization. The members of the two

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1 latter were 'volunteers', if the required numbers
2 were not filled, the remainder were drafted.

3 "The prison system was similarly reorganized
4 under Japanese instructions. Courses were held for
5 the training of newly recruited personnel as well
6 as for the 'improvement' of personnel with previous
7 service. Japanese designations and Japanese markings
8 were introduced. The treatment of prisoners was
9 inhumane.

10 "The Military Government proceeded to lay
11 down a revised educational program with a view to
12 reopening schools for Indonesians.

13 "Elementary education in the People's Schools
14 was revised. Instruction in the Japanese language,
15 songs and dances, and the Japanese type of physical
16 training was introduced. Instruction in reading and
17 mathematics, was substantially reduced and the
18 remainder of the curriculum abolished.

19 "The several types of intermediate schools,
20 with their varied curricula, were abolished to make
21 place for one standard type of intermediate school
22 with a uniform curriculum. This school was divided
23 into a First and a Higher School. The curriculum
24 was very much simplified with foreign languages and
25 general history dropped to make place for Japanese

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23 into a First and a Higher School. The curriculum
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25 general history dropped to make place for Japanese

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1 language and history. Textbooks on the history of
2 the islands were burned and a new textbook was
3 introduced, which emphasized racial affinities and
4 ties of common destiny with Japan.

5 "An entirely new subject was the 'Seisin'
6 (Spirit), which taught Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
7 Sphere ideals to the younger generation, such as the
8 Spirit should be able to overcome all material
9 obstacles. In this vein youngsters were exhorted
10 to fight tanks and other modern weapons, with bamboo
11 spears if necessary.

12 "Vocational schools were reorganized to
13 conform with Japanese conceptions.

14 "Batavia Medical College was reopened on
15 9 March 1943, commemoration day of the 'Foundation
16 of New Java', under the name of Ika Daigaku. Its
17 first president was a Japanese professor, assisted
18 by nine newly appointed Indonesian professors, most
19 of them former associate professors at that College.
20 Six months later, these nine Indonesian professors
21 were demoted to associate professors and succeeded
22 by Japanese professors, brought from Japan, who
23 lectured in Japanese. Instruction in the Japanese
24 language had been obligatory from the outset.

25 "The students pledged themselves to enter

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1 the Japanese Military Government service after gra-
2 duation. Students were billeted and were subject to
3 a strict and semi-military regimentation under spe-
4 cially appointed Japanese, who instructed them in
5 the greatness of Japan and the ideals of the Greater
6 East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

7 "The curriculum of the Medical College was
8 reduced from six to four years.

9 "The Literary, Law and Technical Colleges
10 were not reopened. However, in 1944, again on
11 9 March, a sort of higher vocational school with a
12 limited program covering three years was opened.
13 Students were subjected to the same routine.

14 "Law College was supplanted by one year
15 courses for the training of civilian officials and
16 lawyers. Much time was spent on instruction in the
17 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere ideals and
18 the greatness of Japan. Same regimentation of stu-
19 dents was in force. Instruction in the Japanese
20 Language played an important part.

21 "Private education remained taboo for a
22 long time. In 1943 and 1944, certain former private
23 schools for Indonesians and for Chinese were allowed
24 to reorganize but the curriculum had to conform to
25 the official program."

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1 "Western teaching and education to Occidentals
2 were prohibited throughout the occupation. This pro-
3 hibition was strictly enforced, and the mere suspicion
4 of having taught Occidentals was sufficient to involve
5 the suspect with the Kempeitai.

6 "Considerable numbers of Indonesian College
7 students as well as graduates and prominent personal-
8 ities from the Indonesian community were sent to
9 Japan. A party of journalists from all the islands
10 were taken to Japan to attend the Greater East Asia
11 Journalists' Conference.

12 "All sections of society were organized into
13 corporations along fascist lines.

14 "The organization and political coordination
15 of society was carried out among all racial and
16 political groups as well as among practically all
17 professions and trades, practically all economic
18 sections of society, all cultural groups, all reli-
19 gious groups, the younger generation, sports organiza-
20 tions, and women's movements. The Japanese authori-
21 ties kept a close grip on a particular social group
22 through these organizations and used them to command
23 aid and support from its members for the Army or the
24 Military Government. The corporations were required
25 regularly to turn out in force during mass meetings."

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1 They were utilized for disseminating propaganda
2 among the members. The Japanese used these corpora-
3 tions to keep abreast of public opinion and to conduct
4 espionage.

5 "The Propaganda Department maintained close
6 relations with these organizations. Addresses by
7 Indonesian officials in these organizations were not
8 only pre-censored, but were usually even drafted by
9 the Propaganda Department. These corporations were
10 under close and strict supervision by the Gunseikanbu.
11 The various corporations, all serving uniform purposes
12 and all modeled on the same lines, were instituted by
13 Ordinances issued by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief,
14 Java. Article I of these Ordinances read the same
15 for practically all corporations, and stated that the
16 corporate objective was support to the Japanese Mili-
17 tary Government.

18 "The executives in these corporations were
19 appointed by the Japanese authorities; Branch executives
20 were responsible to the central executive; both were
21 assisted by advisory councils appointed by, or with
22 approval of the Japanese authorities.

23 "The executive body within a corporation was
24 authorized to lay down regulations binding upon its
25 members and membership was obligatory for all within

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1 a given group.

2 "A typical example is provided by the organi-
3 zation of physicians, dentists and dispensers in the
4 Java Izi Hookookai (Corporation for the Public Ser-
5 vice by Medical men in Java), established by Ordinance
6 No. 28, of the Commander-in-Chief in Java, dated
7 3 August 1943, which provided inter alia:

8 "Article 1.: The Java Izi Hookookai is
9 established with the purpose of coordinating those
10 engaged in the field of medicine in Java, to train
11 their knowledge and character and to broaden and raise
12 their capability in curing, and the care for sanita-
13 tion, so that in this way they can give their contri-
14 bution to the utmost to the Dai Nippon Army in medical
15 affairs.

16 "Article 4.: Physicians, dentists and medi-
17 cal experts in Java, who are not Japanese nationals,
18 must become a member of the Izi Hookookai, except
19 enemy nationals.

20 "Article 8.: Besides what has been mentioned
21 in Article 7, the Izi Hookookai carries out special
22 work necessary for conducting the Military Government
23 at the order of the Gunseikan."
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1 "Article 9.: The Head of the Izi Hookookai
2 can issue orders and instructions necessary for
3 carrying out the work stipulated in Articles 7 and
4 8 to the members after obtaining approval from the
5 Gunseikan.

6 "Article 21.: The Izi Hookookai is super-
7 vised by the Gunseikan. The work of the branch
8 officers is supervised by the Syuutyookan (Japanese
9 Local Governor).'

10 "The lawyers, newspapermen, and most, if not
11 all, other professions were similarly organized into
12 single corporations.

13 "In all fields of economic activity there
14 was the same picture of obligatory membership, uni-
15 laterally binding regulations, uniform objects and
16 Japanese executives.

17 "All artists and scholars were organized in
18 the Keimin Bunka Sidosya.

19 "The importance of a truly Oriental artis-
20 tic expression was emphasized and Occidental
21 influences were considered inimical. Paintings and
22 other artistic expressions were to be and were
23 adjudged, not on their artistic value, but solely on
24 their merits in relation to the Greater East Asia
25 Co-Prosperity Sphere. This organization, established

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1 in March 1943, showed the same characteristics as
2 the other corporations: Japanese executives, obliga-
3 tory support to the Army and the Military Government,
4 etc.

5 "The Japanese attached much importance to the
6 spiritual moulding of youth and they took the matter
7 into their own hands completely. The Indonesian
8 Youth Movement, which at the outset had been authorized,
9 was prohibited in the middle of 1943.

10 "As early as December 1942 the Japanese
11 Commander-in-Chief in Java declared that the training
12 of the younger generation to be good citizens of the
13 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was of such
14 paramount importance that the best Japan had to offer
15 was not considered good enough. The matter of guidance
16 and training of youth was kept an exclusively Japanese
17 concern. The organ of control was established by the
18 creation of April 1943 of the Jawa Seinendan (Java
19 Youth Corps).

20 "Its aims were laid down as follows:

21 "In order to convince the youth of Java so
22 that they will energetically cooperate with the Mili-
23 tary Government and render assistance in the building
24 up of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia,
25 it is necessary that they be given guidance and

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1 training.'

2 "In every Syuu a Japanese Training Centre for
3 local instructors was established, and a Central
4 Training Camp was opened near Batavia, all under the
5 direction of Japanese.

6 "Later, a Seinendan was organized in every
7 Ken and Si, each approximately at battalion strength.
8 Some factories had their own Seinendan. These were
9 organized into the Jawa Rengoo Seinendan, (United
10 Youth Corps of Java) on military lines and commanded
11 by Japanese officers of the Army and the Military
12 Government.

13 "Age limits were set at 14 to 25 and if
14 insufficient volunteers were forthcoming more were
15 drafted. Only the physically fit were admitted and
16 those were tested as to their enthusiasm for the
17 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

18 "The official training comprised instruction
19 in the Japanese language oral and written, spiritual
20 and military training, Japanese physical training, air
21 raid precautions, Japanese music and dances, etc.

22 "The manpower for the Booei Giyu Gun (Defence
23 Volunteers Corps), which was organized in September
24 1943, largely came from the youth corps. Soon after
25 its establishment all other youth organizations were

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1 prohibited.

2 "Sports were also brought in line. On
3 21 August 1943 the Tai Iku Kai was organized. The
4 Tai Iku Kai provides the same picture as other cor-
5 porations. In the official explanation of the appli-
6 cable Ordinance it said:

7 "The Jawa Tai Iku Kai will cover the sports-
8 world of all Greater East Asiatic nationals in Java,
9 from office-employees to school-children, and also
10 that of the Keiboodan and the Seinendan. Considering
11 how important sports is for our spiritual and cor-
12 poral training, for learning and developing discipline,
13 and for strengthening the spirit and the determination
14 to work, this Tai Iku Kai is of great importance to
15 the War of Greater East Asia."

16 "In every Ken and Si a branch was established;
17 these branches were organized in their respective Syuu
18 and these again were all subordinated to the Jawa
19 Iku Kai.

20 "The Indonesian women of Java were organized
21 in the Huzin Kai, founded in August 1943."
22
23
24
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1 "Its objects and duties were laid down as follows:

2 " The purpose of this organization is to help the
3 Dai Nippon Army with efforts befitting the position
4 of the women of the original inhabitants and also
5 to raise the women's virtue.

6 "In order to assist in the conduct of the Military
7 Government, the Zigyobu (Working Section), is created
8 within the Huzin Kai; this body has to carry out work
9 necessary for the improvement of conditions behind
10 the front-line and in the field of savings, education,
11 public safety and public health.

12 "In order to deepen the conviction of women in their
13 duties towards the efforts of the defence of the
14 country in wartime, in the first place to give instruc-
15 tion in first aid the Hujin Kai shall be allowed to
16 organize lecture meetings and courses and to establish
17 a close contact with the Seinendan and Keiboodan in
18 conducting exercises so that in future when there
19 is an enemy attack the work can be done as well as
20 possible.'
21

22 "Developments in the other islands, were
23 roughly parallel to those in Java. However, the
24 Japanese living among less advanced peoples, with
25 a lower standard of efficiency among their own
Japanese personnel, and at the same time less depend-

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1 ent on the cooperation of the local population
2 then they were in Java, their chief granary and
3 supply base, they tackled the process of political
4 coordination more sketchily.

5 "III. THE THIRD PHASE

6 "From July 1943 until September 1944.

7 "As early as in the first period, there
8 was some activity by Japanese authorities in the
9 political field, but the policy adopted locally was
10 characterized by the Naval Liaison Officer at
11 Batavia as a policy of 'wait and see.'

12 "Immediately after the occupation a pro-
13 hibition was laid down in Art. 2 of Ordinance No.
14 2 of the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 March
15 1942, which read as follows:

16 "'Until further notice it shall be strictly
17 prohibited to commit the following acts:

18 "'a. participation in any organization;
19 attending any meetings; conducting
20 propaganda in favour of the enemy;
21 the posting of printed or illus-
22 trated placards.'

23 "By Ordinance No. 3, dated 20 March 1942,
24 it was further prohibited to 'discuss, engage in
25 activities, encourage, or make propaganda concerning

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1 the organization and structure of the Government.'

2 "By virtue of these prohibitions certain
3 Indonesian nationalist leaders were arrested by
4 the Kempei in April 1942, some of whom were only
5 released much later.

6 "In December 1942 to January 1943 a large
7 scale round-up was conducted of Indonesians who
8 had engaged in any underground activities of any
9 kind that might possibly be construed as being
10 anti-Japanese. They were - except for those who had
11 been sentenced to death or had died in prisons - not
12 released until September 1945. Even after January
13 1943, the Kempei scrupulously continued to guard
14 against and spy upon all underground activity, which
15 cost a very large number of victims.

16 "In 1942 the Japanese initiated the 'AAA'
17 Movement. This name was announced on big placards
18 displaying the following slogans:

19 "Nippon Pelindung Asia (Japan the Pro-
20 tector of Asia)

21 "Nippon Pemimpin Asia (Japan the Leader
22 of Asia)

23 "Nippon Chahaya Asia (Japan the Light of
24 Asia)

25 "The AAA for Asia were printed larger and in a more

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1 striking colour than the other letters. The themes
2 which this movement elaborated were 'Asia for the
3 Asiatics' and hate against 'foreigners belonging to
4 the white race' and against the 'western exploiters'.
5 The Japanese, on the contrary, were stated to be of
6 the same race and stock as the Indonesians. The
7 language 'the Indonesian people who have the same
8 ancestors and are of the same race as the Japanese,'
9 appeared in Art. 1 of Ordinance No. 1 of the Com-
10 mander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces, dated 7
11 March 1942. Western influence was represented as
12 being a corruption of the Eastern soul; Japan was
13 represented as the Saviour of Asiatic peoples, and
14 the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia under
15 the 'paternal' leadership of Japan was represented
16 as liberating the Asiatic peoples. Apart from the
17 slogan 'New Java' or 'a New Order in Java', the
18 meaning to Java of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
19 Sphere was not defined. Use of the word 'Indonesia'
20 in a political sense was not permitted. In most
21 official publications the Indonesians were referred
22 to as 'the original inhabitants.'

23 "While the AAA Movement was in full swing,
24 further contact was sought with the Indonesian
25 world, and especially with those who were dissatisfied

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1 with the former rule and the rate at which that
2 rule prepared for independence.

3 "Chief among these was Sukarno, who was
4 brought to Java by the Kempei in July 1942, and
5 who formed the so-called 'Ampat Serangkai' (four-
6 leaved clover) with three other nationalists. These
7 became the leaders, under Japanese supervision, of
8 those nationalists who were prepared to cooperate
9 with Japan. The four Serangkai saw in the Japanese
10 promises a means of attaining the early independence
11 for which they were striving. They believed in
12 these promises and advocated complete cooperation
13 with the Japanese Military Government.

14 "The Japanese also sought to approach the
15 group of Indonesian intellectuals who were not dis-
16 contented with the former rule and had held high
17 office thereunder. The Japanese Commander-in-
18 Chief set up, in December 1942, the 'Kyuukan Seido
19 Tyoosa Iinkai' (Committee for the Study of former
20 Customs and Political Systems): 'in order to survey
21 and study the customs and the former governmental
22 systems of the country, and to contribute towards
23 the Administration of Java.' Nine Japanese including
24 the chairman and ten Indonesians, including the 'Four-
25 leaved Clover' and certain former Chiefs of Depart-

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1 ments, former professors and members of the former
2 People's Council, sat on this Committee. It never
3 played an important role and was abolished by the
4 Japanese in November 1943.

5 "The first request to the Japanese authori-
6 ties made by the 'Four Serangkai' was to be allowed
7 to form a party. This request was considered until
8 8 December 1942, when at the commemoration of Pearl
9 Harbour, a big propaganda meeting was held in Batavia,
10 and the Commander-in-Chief publicly promised that
11 a single party for Indonesians only would be per-
12 mitted. The fulfillment of this promise had to
13 wait for a decision from Tokyo.

14 "On 9 March 1943 the 'Putera' Movement
15 was created, deriving its name from a symbolic ab-
16 breviation of 'Pusat Tenaga Rakyat' denoting 'Center
17 of the People's Spiritual Power,' while 'Putera'
18 means 'knight's son.'

19 "Its aims and policy were approximately
20 similar to those of the previously discussed cor-
21 porations, except that the name of this people's
22 movement was not Japanese, but Malay. The Putera
23 was not a party, but only a 'movement' with leaders
24 and advisory councils.
25

"The leaders were appointed by the Commander-

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1 in-Chief and were assisted by the advisory council
2 in which there were approximately equal numbers of
3 Japanese and Indonesians, the latter being nominated
4 by the leader with the approval of the Gunseikan.
5 Local leaders were appointed by the Leader, with
6 Japanese approval.

7 "The organization of the Putera was
8 governed by rules laid down by the Commander-in-
9 Chief, and its aims were officially described by
10 the Japanese as follows:

11 "The object in arousing the strength and
12 efforts of the people is no other than
13 'to support all measures for winning final
14 'victory in the Greater East Asia War.
15 'Since the work of this Movement is very
16 'closely linked with the policy of the Dai
17 'Nippon Military Government, all leaders
18 'must bear in mind that they should have a
19 'profound knowledge of, and faith in, the
20 'aims and objectives of the Dai Nippon
21 'Army.'

22 "In this address the Putera leaders were further
23 urged:

24 "Do your utmost always to be fully aware
25 'of the existing limitations in the present

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1 'situation, and never lead the common
2 'people astray. I hope you will do your
3 'best to fulfill the aims and objectives
4 'of this Movement, and that you will co-
5 'operate in the establishment of the Co-
6 'prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia
7 'and build a New Java to be a member in the
8 'family of nations within the Co-Prosperity
9 'Sphere in Greater East Asia.'

10 "The functions of the Putera were officially set out
11 in the following ten points:

- 12 "1. To impress upon the Indonesian popula-
13 tion their duties and responsibilities
14 in regard to the establishment of a
15 'New Java.'
- 16 "2. To eliminate Occidental influences.
- 17 "3. To participate in the defence of
18 Greater East Asia.
- 19 "4. To foster self-discipline in bearing
20 all mental and physical privations
21 necessary for winning ultimate victory.
- 22 "5. To deepen mutual understanding between
23 the Japanese and Indonesians.
- 24 "6. To encourage the study of the Japanese
25 language. "

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1 "7. To raise the standards of the Indo-
2 nesian population and develop their
3 capacities and character.

4 "8. To encourage the care of health and
5 sport in order to improve the physique
6 of the population.

7 "9. To encourage thrift and savings.

8 "10. To encourage higher production in
9 every field and to develop a love of
10 work.

11 "The Putera was only for Indonesians. The
12 new social hierarchy introduced by the Japanese com-
13 prised the following grades: 1. Japanese; 2.
14 Indonesians; 3. other Asiatics; 4. mixtures of
15 Indonesians with other groups; 5. Europeans. There-
16 by, Indonesians, being the 'original inhabitants',
17 were treated as a privileged category, while groups
18 3 to 5 were treated as foreigners, with the Europeans
19 and Eurasians receiving the worst treatment.

20 "About the same time as the institution
21 of the Putera, the restrictions on travel by so-called
22 'foreigners' were strengthened. Moreover, it was
23 ordered that everyone must immediately inform the
24 policy when lodging someone from outside the place
25 of his residence. 'Forbidden zones' were introduced

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1 covering the entire South coast and the two Eastern
2 and Western extremities of Java, where no 'foreigners'
3 were allowed to enter and for which even Indo-
4 nesians needed a pass.

5 "The first great enthusiasm for the Putera
6 dwindled when it became apparent that the activities
7 of this body, to which the population had looked
8 forward, were to be entirely restricted to the basic
9 principles laid down by the Japanese propaganda ser-
10 vice. There was great disappointment when the
11 originally planned Youth Movement of the Putera was
12 forbidden, and the Japanese authorities set up instead
13 their own youth movement.

14 "Meanwhile, outside the East Indies great
15 changes had taken place. Japan had been forced from
16 an offensive into a defensive position and lines of
17 communication were seriously threatened.

18 "Against this background, on 16 June 1943,
19 Prime Minister TOJO made a speech in the Diet wherein,
20 inter alia, he stated that in view of the fact that
21 the people of Java had shown their readiness to co-
22 operate with the Japanese Military Administration,
23 they should be given participation in the government.
24 On this occasion TOJO also promised so-called inde-
25 pendence to Burma and to the Philippines."

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1 "In pursuence of this promise, Prime Minister
2 TOJO visited the Southern Regions in person.

3 "Enroute to Java, TOJO called at Manila
4 and Singapore, repeating the promise of 'independence'
5 for the Philippines and Burma. In Java no 'inde-
6 pendence' was promised, but only participation in
7 the Government. The promise was coupled with the
8 conditions that there should be complete coopera-
9 tion with the Japanese Military Administration in
10 order to win ultimate victory.

11 "Following this promise, in August 1943,
12 an Indonesian was appointed Chief of the Syuumubu
13 (Department of Religious Affairs), but actual control
14 remained in the hands of Japanese section heads; and
15 two others were appointed Syuutyoo (Chief of a Resi-
16 dency) in the two smallest Residencies of Java, with
17 actual power in the hands of the Japanese Vice-Chief.
18 Furthermore, a number of Indonesians were officially
19 appointed to lower positions, which they had held
20 before, and were incorporated into the Japanese
21 Administrative Corps and were accorded corresponding
22 Japanese rank."

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1 "The 'San-yo Seido' (Adviser System) was
2 introduced, and Indonesians were nominated to be adviser
3 to seven Departments. The San-yo only acted when ques-
4 tions were referred to him for advice.

5 "In all Residencies and also in the Special
6 Municipality of Batavia an advisory body, the Sang Kai,
7 was established to advise the Resident in matters of
8 local government, by Ordinance No. 37 of the Commander-
9 in-Chief, dated 5 September 1943. This Ordinance
10 prescribed the numbers of members of each Sangi Kai to
11 be appointed and elected, respective. The 'elections'
12 were indirect with nomination of the candidates not
13 public and the ballot not secret. The function of the
14 Sangi Kai was to answer questions concerning local
15 government put to it by the Syuutyoo with the right
16 to make suggestions on the referred subject. It could
17 only meet on orders from the Syuutyoo, and sittings
18 were opened and closed on his orders. Officials of
19 the Syuutyoo office could attend and participate.

20 "The sessions were only public for the
21 opening address, which was drafted and censored before-
22 hand, and for the closing session. The sessions proper
23 were held behind closed doors. At the final session
24 motions, discussed and settled during the closed
25 meetings, were put to a mock vote and always passed

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1 unanimously. Sessions scarcely ever lasted longer
2 then four to five days. The Chairman was appointed
3 from amongst the members on nomination by the Syuutyoo.
4 Every Sangi Kai sent representatives to the Tyuwoo
5 Sangi-In, the Central Advisory Council of Java.

6 "This was established on 5 September 1943,
7 by Ordinance No. 36, 'for the speedy and efficient
8 execution of the measures of the Military Government.'
9 Twenty-three out of forty-three members were nominated
10 in advance by the Commander-in-chief. Of the remainder,
11 eighteen were 'elected' by the various Sangi Kai, and
12 two were nominated by the Sultanates. The procedure
13 was the same as that of the local Sangi Kai. They
14 were only empowered to offer advice in respect to ques-
15 tions put by the Commander-in-Chief or the Resident,
16 and to make suggestions relating thereto."

17 THE PRESIDENT: Would you care to rest for a
18 moment or two?

19 MRS. STROOKER: I would like a drink, your
20 Honor, thank you.

21 "The actual direction of affairs rested with
22 the Head of the Record Office, called the Tyuwoo Sangi-
23 In Zimu Kyoku Tyoo, who was a Japanese, as were also
24 the other officials of his office. The function of
25 this office was to deal with incoming and outgoing

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1 correspondence as well as to exercise internal super-
2 vision over the activities of the Tyuuoo Sangi-In.
3 The Head and his staff were appointed by the Commander-
4 in-Chief and the first Head was the then private secre-
5 tary of Prime Minister TOJO.

6 "Similarly, the Secretary of the local Advisory
7 Council was always a Japanese from the Syuutyoo's office.
8 From the very beginning these organizations were used
9 as an instrument of Japanese propaganda to recruit
10 labour and 'Volunteers' for the military organizations
11 and to encourage the population to increase agricultur-
12 al output and to deliver the crops to the Military
13 Government.

14 "As a further local participation measure
15 wider administrative powers were given to the Sultans
16 of Central-Java in elementary education, local govern-
17 ment at lower levels, public health, and farming, etc.

18 "Almost simultaneously with the establish-
19 ment of the Central Advisory Council, as was later
20 officially declared by the Commander-in-Chief, the
21 Japanese Military Administration took the view that
22 the Indonesian population of Java ought to give con-
23 crete expression of its appreciation of Prime Minister
24 TOJO's promise now that it had been translated into
25 fact, and that it was their duty to demonstrate their

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1 preparedness to support the Japanese Military Adminis-
2 tration by organizing a Volunteers' Corps.

3 "The Propaganda service ensured that it should
4 appear to the outside world that the inhabitants them-
5 selves were desirous of having their own army.

6 "At the end of August 1943, an old friend of
7 Sukarno forwarded a petition, signed 'with his own
8 blood,' to the Commander-in-Chief of Java for permis-
9 sion to set up a Volunteers' Corps as the first of a
10 large series of such requests. The Commander-in-Chief
11 declared in the beginning of October 1943 that he was
12 favourably disposed towards these petitions, and that
13 he considered, moreover, that the population of Java
14 was very rightly desirous of offering some return for
15 TOJO's promise; and by Ordinance No. 44, dated
16 3 October 1943, he instituted the Kyodo Booei Giyu Gun
17 (Army of Vounteers for the Defence of the Homeland).
18 The aim of the Corps was 'to call upon the original
19 inhabitants (i.e., Indonesians) for the defence of
20 Java, based upon the principle of the joint defence
21 of Greater East Asia.'

22 "Article 4 laid down:

23 "The Volunteer Corps should be thoroughly
24 convinced of the ideals and importance of the task of
25 defending the homeland, and it is its duty to partake

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1 in the defence of the home country in the respective
2 Syuu against the Allies under the leadership of the
3 Dai Nippon Army.'

4 "By virtue of this Ordinance, the Giyu Gun was
5 commended by the Commander-in-Chief of Java. It was
6 emphatically stated that this Corps was not to form
7 part of the Japanese Army and would have its own officers,
8 but it would be trained by Japanese instructors. It
9 would not be used outside Java and would consist of
10 volunteers.

11 "Recruiting for the first levy started immedi-
12 ately, but with the following levies it appeared that
13 there was insufficient enthusiasm, so that with each
14 new levy each Regency was told how many 'volunteers'
15 were required in order to bring formations up to
16 strength. One of the chief activities of Japanese
17 propaganda was to encourage enlistment in this corps.
18 In October 1943 the training of the 'officers' was
19 started and lasted three months.

20 "The object was to form one or more battalions
21 of about 1000 men per Syuu (Residency) which would
22 together make up a unit for the defence of the Syuu.
23 At the time of Japan's capitulation this object had
24 been achieved. In the defence of the Syuu, the task
25 of the Giyu Gun was mainly one of guarding road

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1 junctions, bridges and other strategically important
2 points. Weapons were only supplied to these 'volunteers'
3 for the duration of the drills, and training mostly
4 took place with wooden guns. The Beppan, a special
5 section of the Headquarters of the 16th Japanese Army,
6 an intelligence organization, was charged with train-
7 ing, and at the same time made use of it both for
8 spying upon the new volunteers as well as using them
9 as spies.

10 "Prior to this, the Japanese had made use of
11 Indonesians as auxiliary forces. Shortly after the
12 occupation many Indonesian soldiers were partly re-
13 cruited and partly compelled to serve as a 'Heiho'
14 (auxiliary soldier). These units formed part of the
15 Japanese Army and were issued a Japanese uniform. They
16 were generally used in the Ordnance Corps, and to guard
17 camps occupied by women and civilian internees. Heiho
18 were sent off the island.

19 "The Japanese Navy similarly made use of
20 Indonesian Heiho.

21 "Both the Giyu Gun and the Heiho were taught
22 to speak Japanese. Commands were issued in Japanese,
23 and the regulations were written in Japanese. They
24 wore Japanese insignia. An important part of the
25 training was instruction in 'Seisin' (Spirit). "

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1 "One of the important aims of Japanese prop-
2 aganda was the increase of farming crops and their
3 delivery to the Japanese Military Administration. The
4 island of Java had to provide large quantities of food
5 for the Japanese occupation troops and troops fighting
6 in the East. Besides, the Japanese Army of Occupation
7 was laying up large stocks of supplies. Java, which
8 before the war had barely been able to meet the essen-
9 tial food requirements of its own population, was ex-
10 pected to produce more. This increase in production
11 was obstructed by the lack of proper supervision over
12 irrigation works, due to the replacement of interned
13 Dutch experts by insufficiently trained Japanese, and
14 by haphazard methods adopted by the Japanese in the
15 pursuance of their ends in forcing the production of
16 desired agricultural commodities unsuitable to the
17 climate and geographic conditions. All this further
18 reduced the area available for food crops.

19 "It became less and less advantageous for
20 the simple farmer to hand over his produce to the Jap-
21 anese authorities. From the outset, the Japanese
22 adopted the policy of the Netherlands Indies Govern-
23 ment to stabilize the price of rice at a proper level.
24 As the Japanese military guilder decreased in its
25 purchasing value, the official price for rice soon

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1 fell far below its former value relative to other
2 commodities. Articles that the farmer used to buy with
3 the proceeds of his rice became virtually unobtainable.

4 "The Japanese authorities ordered that 60 per
5 cent of the harvest of food produced had to be delivered
6 to them. They took far-reaching measures to combat
7 the black market in rice and other food products, such
8 as the imposing of closed regional economic areas,
9 enforced by checkpoints on the highways. The threshing
10 of rice -- except for individual consumption -- in
11 other than 'coordinated' mills was prohibited.

12 "The propaganda service exerted all its powers
13 to persuade the farmers to cultivate wider areas in
14 order to obtain more produce. It also tried to per-
15 suade the inhabitants to yield their crops to the
16 Japanese Military Administration.

17 "Not only in Java, but throughout the
18 Southern Regions, Japan used labour everywhere, for
19 the building of military fortifications, airfields,
20 strategic railways, etc. Java was a source for such
21 labour. From the very commencement, Japanese propa-
22 ganda went all out to encourage the voluntary enlist-
23 ment of these coolies. In this, at first, the Japanese
24 were successful. When the inhabitants learned how
25 these coolies were being treated by the Japanese, their

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1 desire to work for them practically disappeared. This
2 became worse when the coolies sent out of Java did not
3 return, and no news whatever was received from them.

4 "The Japanese thereafter adopted conscription,
5 whereby each Regency was informed as to how many coolies
6 had to be drafted, both for the work in Java itself,
7 and for labour outside that island.

8 "In 1943 the propaganda service started a vigorous
9 campaign in which the 'Prajurit Ekonomi' (the economic
10 warrior) was represented as fulfilling a sacred task
11 by working for the Japanese Army. It was no longer
12 permissible to speak of coolies; the coolie was also
13 a soldier, and his contribution to the war effort had
14 to be greatly appreciated. The recruiting of the
15 coolies was undertaken by every possible means; one
16 of these was that the houses of relatives left behind
17 were provided with a sign 'Prajurit Pekerja', and it
18 was pointed out to the public that one should honour
19 such houses and their occupants, whilst this sign was
20 said henceforth to guarantee special protection.
21 Furthermore, theoretically these relatives enjoyed
22 certain privileges in the distribution of scarce
23 commodities, such as clothing -- a privilege enjoyed
24 only after all government officials had received their
25 share."

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1 "These labourers received less care than the
2 prisoners of war and internees, and their condition was
3 aggravated by their ignorance of hygienic precautions
4 and medical care. While the correct figures of those
5 who were transported outside Java as Romushas are not
6 known, the official estimates of the Japanese after
7 the capitulation indicate a figure of 270,000 men, of
8 whom not more than 70,000 have been recovered since
9 the war's end. Most of the returnees suffered inhumane
10 maltreatment. Accommodation, food, medical care were
11 not only thoroughly inadequate, but in many cases absent
12 altogether. During certain periods, 'romushas' who had
13 died from starvation and contagious diseases were daily
14 carried away by the cartload from certain camps.

15 "In religious matters the propaganda service
16 made an effort to obtain complete cooperation from
17 the population.

18 "These activities were especially directed at
19 influencing the Mohammedans, who formed the large major-
20 ity of the population, while propaganda among other
21 religions was of far less importance. Priests and
22 preachers of an 'enemy race' were forbidden to conduct
23 services except for people of an 'enemy race'. If an
24 'enemy' priest or preacher noticed an Indonesian among
25 the congregation he was to see to it that the latter
left on penalty of very severe punishment."

DEWEELD

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1 "This policy embodied three principles. First,
2 the Japanese Army declared itself to be the protector
3 of Islam and that the Mohammedan religion would be
4 respected.

5 "For the second point the Gunseikan declared that
6 religious associations would soon be authorized to
7 carry on their activities and that they had the
8 noble task of propagating the ideals of Great East
9 Asia and the support of the Military Administration.

10 "For the third point, the Gunseikan declared
11 that the cooperation of the Islamic community in
12 respect to education was acceptable in so far as it
13 was directed at full support to the Japanese Army
14 and imbued with the ideals of the Greater East Asia
15 Co-Prosperity Sphere. With this restriction religious
16 education would be permitted and officially sup-
17 ported with books and other facilities.

18 "The Syuumubu established a permanent training
19 centre in Batavia where courses lasting three weeks
20 in Japanese ideology were given to groups of sixty
21 kiais and oelamas each.

22 "These courses were also used to test whether
23 Japanese propaganda had any effect, and afforded a
24 means of selecting suitable collaborators. These
25 accomplices carried the propaganda to the simple rural

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1 population, and were responsible for the production
2 and delivery of sufficient rice for a sufficient
3 supply of labourers and for enlistments as 'volunteer'
4 or heiho.

5 "The Japanese adopted the old device of working
6 on the fanaticism of Islamites, and they tried to
7 persuade the kiais and oelamas to declare the
8 Greater East Asia War as a 'sabil' (holy) war against
9 the kafir (unbeliever). When the point that the
10 Japanese were themselves unbelievers was raised, the
11 'common ancestry,' the 'common race' and the 'des-
12 tiny common to the Japanese and the Indonesians'
13 were pointed out.

14 "In the beginning of 1944 religious disturbances
15 occurred in the Indramayu district and at Garut. The
16 Japanese held the Indonesian leader of the Syuumubu
17 (Religious Affairs Department) responsible, and he
18 was replaced by one of the oldest and most popular
19 kiais of Java. He accepted this post and spent one
20 day in Batavia, but immediately returned to his re-
21 ligious institution, leaving the direction of the
22 Syuumubu to the Japanese heads of sections.

23 "From November 1943 the Mashumi became the or-
24 ganization through which the Japanese authorities
25 ruled the Islamic intellectual world, and through it

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1 carried on propaganda for Japanese ideals, sounded
2 public opinion and executed espionage.

3 "The relationship between the Mashumi and the
4 Syuumubu was constantly strengthened until at last
5 the Mashumi was for all purposes directed by the
6 Syuumubu.

7 "Besides this the Japanese established Syuumuka
8 (Religious Affairs Sections) in every Syuu under
9 locally prominent Kiais. They had the duty of making
10 Military Administration policy understood in the
11 villages. These agencies were gradually extended
12 even to the smallest local subdivisions under a
13 local Kiai.

14 "The Syuumubu issued a publication called
15 'Asshu'lah,' edited in Malay, Javanese and Sundanese,
16 but printed in Arab script, the only script the
17 orthodox kiais could read. This periodical was dis-
18 tributed free of charge amongst all kiais in Java.

19 "The Japanese also made several efforts to
20 coordinate the Chinese who although comparatively
21 few in number, were the mainstay of the middle class.
22 The Japanese first tried to induce leading officials
23 of the many Chinese associations (which had all been
24 dissolved in March 1942) to form one big organization,
25 but the effort completely failed."

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1 "The Japanese decided in August 1943 to establish
2 the Kakyoo Sookai with the support of a few promi-
3 nent pro-Nanking Chinese.

4 "The Kakyoo Sookai was organized along the cus-
5 tomary lines, with its leaders appointed by the
6 Japanese authorities, and close cooperation with the
7 Japanese Military Administration as the prime object.
8 No action was taken on their own initiative and the
9 organization was used to disseminate Japanese pro-
10 paganda and as an espionage organization.

11 "At the same time the Japanese made certain
12 concessions, such as permission for limited Chinese
13 private school education, and for sending small re-
14 mitances to their families in Japanese-occupied
15 parts of China. This latter permission was not kept.

16 "The Eurasians, who occupied mainly the middle
17 strata of technical and administrative occupations,
18 were at first ostracized. Japanese replaced them in
19 the higher ranks, but not nearly enough were available
20 for the more numerous intermediate ranks, and trained
21 Indonesians were insufficient in numbers.

22 "The first effort to secure the cooperation of
23 the Eurasian group was made in September 1943. The
24 Eurasians who had been regarded as 'aliens,' gra-
25 dually began to be treated as belonging to the

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indigenous population next to the Indonesian group.

1 The Japanese stipulated, however, that the Eurasians
2 had to realize that from then on they were to feel and
3 act as members of the Greater East Asia community
4 under the leadership of Japan, and had to renounce
5 their western ancestry.

6 "The Japanese promised the Eurasians to admit
7 number of their children to village schools which had
8 so far been reserved for Indonesian children.
9 Separate schools for Eurasian children remained for-
10 bidden.

11 "In the beginning of 1944 the Japanese decided
12 to dissolve the Putera and to replace it by an or-
13 ganization in which all Asiatics would combine efforts
14 to achieve ultimate victory in the Holy War.

15 "According to the Japanese it had failed to reach
16 the simple villager, who comprised about 80% of the
17 total population of Java and supplied the man power
18 for army and labor services and the production of food
19 crops for the Japanese. The movement became too
20 strongly nationalistic.

21 "The new organization followed a pattern used
22 in Japan and combined the propaganda machinery with
23 the organization for the distribution of essential
24 supplies. Starting in January 1944, the whole of
25

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1 Java was divided into small communities of about 20
2 houses each, called Tonari Gumi (Neighbours' Asso-
3 ciations). These Tonari Gumi were organized on cen-
4 tralized lines. They were headed by a Kumityoo, who
5 was appointed from above and who was responsible for
6 the execution of the orders given to him. All
7 existing associations, social, fire precautionary,
8 agricultural, etc., were absorbed by the Tonari Gumi.

9 "The duties of this institution were very ex-
10 tensive. Not only distribution, but also regular
11 training for air raid defense and guerilla warfare
12 were its responsibility. Furthermore, the head of the
13 community had to lecture at least once a week to his
14 people on Japanese ideology and the practical appli-
15 cation thereof. At these meetings the Japanese aims
16 in regard to the population were extolled according
17 to instructions from the Japanese propaganda service.
18 This was done mostly by Indonesians, specially
19 trained by the Japanese who remained behind the scene.

20 "Other meetings were held for larger units
21 (called Aza; a village was divided into two or more
22 Aza) once a month. One member of each family had to
23 attend these meetings.

24 "All inhabitants of the area of one Tonari Gumi,
25 including non-interned Eurasians, had to be members

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1 of the organization. Only membership gave distri-
2 bution facilities.

3 "On March 9, 1944, when the Tonari Gumi were
4 working satisfactorily, the Putera was officially
5 dissolved and the 'Jawa Hooko Kai' (Corporation for
6 Communal Services in Java), comprising all Asiatic
7 groups was officially installed. This corporation
8 remained as the instrument of Japanese control un-
9 til August 31, 1945, when it was dissolved.

10 "According to the official explanation accompany-
11 ing the Ordinance (8 January 1944) founding it, the
12 Jawa Hookoo Kai was set up as an organ of the
13 Military Administration to carry out its instruc-
14 tions in an atmosphere of 'friendly cooperation' with
15 all inhabitants. It was the organization's duty to
16 see that these instructions reached all the people
17 and it was to work in close relationship with the
18 Tonari Gumi. Its leaders were responsible for
19 seeing that everyone was enlisted in the positive
20 support of the Military Administration. According
21 to this explanation the Jawa Hooko kai was in fact
22 an executive body, based on the principle of com-
23 plete coordination of all inhabitants and was,
24 therefore, an organization of the entire populace.

25 "The central direction of the Jawa Kookoo Kai

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1 was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and con-
2 sisted of Japanese exclusively. The Executive Bureau
3 under the supervision of the central direction had
4 several Indonesians. Branches were established in
5 all localities. The Ku Hooko Kai, the smallest union,
6 supervised one or more Aza which in turn supervised
7 a number of Tonari Gumi.

8 "The leader of these local Hooko Kai was the
9 head of the local administration, assisted by a
10 council (Kaigi), appointed by him. A session of the
11 Kaigi had to be held at least every six months, when
12 ways and means of promoting assistance to the
13 Military Government had to be discussed.

14 "The Tonari Gumi formed the lowest bodies in the
15 Jawa Hooko Kai. Their task was:

16 "a. active support to police and Keibooden
17 (village guards) in the defence of their country
18 and during air raids, against enemy parachutists,
19 enemy espionage, natural calamities, fire and crime.

20 "b. to make the inhabitants understand the
21 aims of laws, regulations, etc., of the Military
22 Administration.

23 "c. stimulation of increased food production;
24 encouragement of delivery of these products to the
25 authorities; the distribution of daily necessities."

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1 "d. general support to the Military Administra-
2 tion, e.g., by protecting members of families of
3 Heiho (auxiliary troops), volunteers and romushas
4 (coolies) who had left their villages.

5 "e. mutual help and assistance.

6 "The Jawa Hookoo Kai absorbed all organizations
7 pursuing similar aims, regardless of nationality, in-
8 cluding the Japanese. The Huzin Kai (Womens' Cor-
9 poration), the Mashumi (the Islamic Corporation), the
10 Kakyoo Sookai (Corporation of Chinese), the Tai Tku
11 Kai (Sports Corporation), the Keimin Bunka Sidosya
12 (Cultural Corporation), etc., mentioned before, were
13 all incorporated in the Jawa Hookoo Kai.

14 "The activities by the Eurasians for their
15 mutual support brought on systematic prosecution by
16 the Kempei-tai. Dozens of their leaders died in
17 prison during the occupation as a result of ill treat-
18 ment, starvation, contagious diseases (caused by
19 crowded prisons without sufficient sanitation) or
20 sentences by courts martial.

21 "Anyone who once attracted suspicion was tortured
22 in such a way that false confessions were a daily
23 occurrence; and these in turn often brought fresh
24 victims within the clutches of the Kempei-tai. A
25 typical example of this happened in 1944 in Pontianak

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1 on the west coast of Borneo, where more than 1200
2 prominent Indonesian and Chinese, including the
3 local nobility, were executed on an entirely un-
4 founded suspicion of conspiracy. Also in Java the
5 Indonesians were in constant fear of the Kempei.
6 Greatest care had to be taken in speaking since spies
7 were around everywhere. There are hundreds of cases
8 where people of all races were most cruelly tortured
9 on the strength of reports of a usually entirely
10 innocent conversation, by means of the 'water-cure,'
11 electrification, hanging by limbs, use of boa con-
12 strictors, etc."

13 THE PRESIDENT: This is a convenient break.
14 We will adjourn until half past one.

15 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was
16 taken.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mrs. Strooker.

4 MRS. STROOKER: I will continue reading from
5 page 44 where I left off, your Honor.

6 "Outside Java the same policy was adhered to
7 in regard to political and religious activities.
8 Here again, following TOJO's promise, a number of
9 prominent cooperative Indonesians were appointed
10 to posts in the Administration. Bodies similar to
11 the Sangi Kai (local Advisory Councils) were estab-
12 lished but this process was considerably slower
13 than in Java. Territories administered by the
14 Navy in turn were slower to follow than those under
15 Army Occupation. In the Naval areas (Celebes,
16 Borneo, etc.) the stage where Tyuuoo Sangi-In
17 (Central Advisory Council) was formed was never
18 reached. In Sumatra, however, a Tyuuoo Sangi-In
19 for that island was installed at Fort de Kock in
20 February 1945. No organization similar to the
21 Putera was permitted in spite of requests from
22 Indonesian intellectuals.

23 "Compared with Java, propaganda in the other
24 islands was more concentrated on the younger genera-
25 tion."

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1 "'Volunteers Corps' similar to the Giyu Gun
2 were established.

3 "The four basic aims of Japanese propaganda were
4 given full play during the course of 1944. Using
5 the slogan of 'Asia for the Asiatics' and teaching
6 religious hatred, the Japanese worked upon all
7 sections of society by holding courses of instruc-
8 tion. The first group to be dealt with was that of
9 school teachers, followed later by policemen, heads
10 of villages, minor officials of the civil service,
11 higher officials, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers
12 and personnel of all government offices. Even the
13 smallest group was given attention in turn.

14 "This propaganda, however crude, was to some
15 extent successful, partly due to chaotic conditions
16 and the distress and hardships suffered by the
17 population.

18 "The Japanese clearly realized the potential
19 dangers of this situation. It was the task of
20 the propaganda service to bend these sentiments in
21 some other direction by way of distraction from
22 Japan's occupation. There was a constantly increasing
23 campaign of hatred against the Occident, especially
24 against the United States and Britain, which countries,
25 together with Holland were held responsible for all

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1 the sufferings of the population.

2 "IV. FOURTH PHASE

3 "September 1944 - August 1945.

4 "The strategic situation outside Java meanwhile
5 had considerably changed. The break-through at
6 Saipan had occurred and violently shook the very
7 foundations of the Japanese defense. The TOJO
8 Cabinet was succeeded by the KOISO Cabinet, which
9 recognized that it had to face the isolation of
10 the Southern Regions, and the necessity for the
11 Japanese troops there to stand by themselves, and
12 that it was more and more important to gain popular
13 cooperation.

14 "When the way in which TOJO's promise was going
15 to be realized became known in August 1943, disappoint-
16 ment was expressed rather clearly among those prom-
17 inent Indonesians, who still placed confidence in
18 Japan's promises. The Japanese were warned that
19 they had to accelerate satisfying nationalist aspira-
20 tions in the Southern Regions if they were to retain
21 the full cooperation from this group.

22 "On 7 September 1944, in the Diet, Prime Minister
23 KOISO, after having promised Korea and Formosa equality
24 of rights enjoyed by the Japanese, made a promise of
25 independence for the East Indies. (Exhibit No. 277)."

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1 "In this speech it was not made clear exactly
2 what region would gain independence when granted.

3 "The promise of independence was conditioned on
4 the people defending their own territory for the
5 support of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
6 Sphere. The extent of this so-called independence
7 was only defined by reference to membership in the
8 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as an
9 application of the Hakko Ichiu ideal.
10

11 "Previously, towards the end of August 1944,
12 the 16th Army Headquarters in Java had been informed
13 confidentially of the contents of this statement,
14 and issued certain secret orders to various Japanese
15 organizations. Those orders, Prosecution documents
16 Nos. 2756 and 2757, were recovered in the building,
17 used by the Gunseikanbu during the Japanese occupation
18 of Batavia."

19 With the Court's permission I offer in
20 evidence prosecution's document 2756.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

22 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
23 No. 2756 will receive exhibit No. 1352.

24 (Whereupon, the document above re-
25 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
No. 1352 and received in evidence.)

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1 MRs. STROOKER: I beg to be allowed to read
2 exhibit No. 1352.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

4 MRs. STROCKER: (Reading): "SECRET.

5 "Notification regarding measures ensuing from
6 the Proclamation of Admission of the Independence
7 of the East-Indies.

8 "From: Chief of Staff Osamu Army Corps

9 "To:" (blank) (September 1944)

10 "We hereby notify you that, based on the Prime
11 Minister's proclamation regarding the granting of
12 the independence of the East-Indies at the 85th
13 Special Session of the Diet today, the 7th of
14 September, it is decided that the Army will meet the
15 situation properly generally in accordance with the
16 following stipulations:

17 "1. The purport of the granting of independence
18 shall be thoroughly understood (based on the Prime
19 Minister's speech).

20 "2. It is not permitted to touch upon the time
21 /T.N. of the granting of independence/ the sphere of
22 the East-Indies nor the form of government until
23 these are finally decided.

24 "3. National consciousness must be raised to
25 the highest degree; especially during the execution

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1 of the war this must be utilized to strengthen
2 defence, co-operation with Military Government, and
3 to make Japan and Java one and inseparable.

4 "4. There shall be no great alterations in
5 the operations and the business structure of the
6 Military Government. However, participation in
7 the Government shall be enlarged and strengthened,
8 and political training shall be carried out.

9 "5. Nationalistic speeches and activities
10 shall be actively allowed; for that purpose the
11 following measures shall be taken:

12 "a. Permission to sing the national anthem
13 and to use the national flag;

14 "b. The use of nationalistic terms such as
15 'the Indonesian people' shall not be restricted.

16 "c. The appointment of nationalists.

17 "d. Those advocates of independence who are
18 connected with the Communist Party shall not be
19 allowed to exist.

20 "6. Investigation and study necessary for
21 independence executed by the local inhabitants under
22 the guidance of Military Government shall be recognized.

23 "7. Thorough measures shall be taken for the
24 spreading of the Japanese language, the adoption of
25 Japanese institutions and the infusion of the Japanese

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culture.

1 "8. There shall be no distinction between the
2 natives and other races, especially those who are
3 to be treated as local inhabitants, but they must
4 be made to understand the elemental point that they
5 must participate in the construction of a new
6 society, and must co-operate with all their might.

7 "9. All Japanese must realize and put into
8 practice the mission of this new era in which the
9 divine work of HakkoIchu(T.N. Same as 'ichiu')
10 (T.N. the whole world one family) is to be carried
11 out. Especially the idea of colonial subjugation
12 has to be banned; and towards the natives we must
13 be like parents and elder brothers and sisters,
14 approaching them with affectionate feelings while
15 instructing and guiding them sternly. Haughty and
16 arrogant speech or behavior shall not be allowed under
17 any circumstances.

18 "10. In guiding the public opinion stress shall
19 be laid on the raising of national consciousness,
20 the intensification of war-mindedness, confidence
21 in and reliance upon Japan and the desperate determina-
22 tion to win complete victory ensuing therefrom, and
23 on the manifestation of leadership in carrying out
24 these things."
25

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1 "11. Looking at the other side of the joy on
2 the granting of independence we naturally anticipate
3 the confusion accompanying shifts and changes of
4 powers, but it is absolutely forbidden to meddle
5 in these; we must guide them always standing aloof.

6 "12. Although the insatiability which springs
7 from the Indonesian character may sometimes provoke
8 our resentment, we must not be hostile, but guide
9 them, sternly indicating the established policy;
10 a so-called flattering attitude is not allowed.

11 "13. As for the instruction of the Volunteer
12 Defence Corps, on this occasion particularly we
13 must scrutinize the attitude of officers and men
14 towards them, and the main points of the instruction
15 in order to deepen the feeling of unity; and we must
16 not let them get the feeling that they form an inde-
17 pendent army.

18 "Special attention shall be paid to the training
19 of instructors. This also applies to the Hei-Ho (T.N.
20 auxiliary troops).

21 "14. In observing the real situation of the
22 people we must not fall into the superficial view
23 that the aim of securing their confidence in Japan
24 and raising their war-mindedness has been attained,
25 by judging from their enthusiasm and festive excitement;

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1 but we must observe them, guiding them firmly and
2 continually according to our principle of guidance.

3 "15. Planning and execution in the field of
4 general direction shall be the duty of Military
5 Government, and others must co-operate with it.
6 There must be no inconsistency whatsoever in carrying
7 out the policy.

8 "16. In general the several functions will be
9 as follows:

10 "a. The 7th day of September is designated
11 as National Independence Commemoration Day, and the
12 week from the 7th until the 13th shall be the National
13 Festival (temporary name) and thanksgiving functions
14 will be performed at that time.

15 "b. On the 7th the Provincial Governors
16 shall assemble and the Commander-in-Chief will
17 indicate the policy to cope with the new situation.

18 "c. On the 8th it is anticipated that a
19 ceremony will be held at which the representatives
20 of the inhabitants will express their gratitude.

21 "d. On the 9th or the 10th a special session
22 of the Council shall be convened in every province
23 and the special municipality, and on the 11th, a
24 special session of the Central Council."

25 I may mention that I forgot to read the date,

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1 your Honor: 7 September 1944.

2 I tender in evidence prosecution document
3 2757.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
6 2757 will receive exhibit No. 1353.

7 (Whereupon, the document above re-
8 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
9 No. 1353 and received in evidence.)

10 MRS. STROOKER: I beg the Court's leave to
11 be allowed to read prosecution's exhibit 1353.

12 "CONFIDENTIAL

13 "Basic Outline of Propaganda and Enlighten-
14 ment attendant on the Proclamation re Recognition
15 of the Independence of the EAST-INDIES.

16 "GUN&EIKAMBU (Inspectorate of Military
17 Administration).

18 "September 7, 1944. (showa 19)

19 "Policy.

20 "Based upon the statement of the Commander-in-
21 Chief, to promote the racial consciousness of the
22 INDONES- IANS and to incite this into a hostile feeling
23 for the complete prosecution of the War to exterminate
24 the U.S.A. and BRITAIN.

25 "Outline."

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1 "1. The promotion of the racial consciousness
2 of the INDONESIAN Race by the establishment of
3 racial ideals shall be planned.

4 "2. The responsibility and efforts of the race
5 shall be stressed, in addition to which they shall
6 be made to realize their aggravated mission for
7 the complete prosecution of the War, and the
8 inspiration which may be aroused shall be incited
9 into a hostile feeling for the complete prosecution
10 of the War to exterminate the U.S.A. and BRITAIN.

11 "3. Measures necessary for the Independence
12 shall be left entirely to the ARMY, and they (T.N.
13 the people) shall be made to understand the necessity
14 of offering themselves entirely for defense and
15 services to the Military Administration during the
16 War.

17 "4. They shall be made to look back upon the
18 process of the glorious spreading of creed of
19 'Hakko-iu (T.N. same as ICHI-U, i.e. making the
20 whole world as one family) and the realization of
21 the national policy of the EMPIRE (T.N. JAPAN) by
22 means of the independence and participation in the
23 government of BURMA and the Philippines; in this way
24 they shall be induced to increase their confidence
25 in and reliance upon the EMPIRE (T.N. JAPAN) and also

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1 to manifest their deep emotion for the August Virtue.
2 of His Majesty and the sincerity of their devotion
3 to the Emperor.

4 "5. Those who have blamed persons co-operating
5 with the Army or those who have been negative in
6 their co-operation with JAPAN while maintaining
7 a dubious attitude, shall be ostracised, and the
8 fact that co-operation with the Military Administra-
9 tion implies the prosperity of INDONESIA shall be
10 clarified, thereby forcing out and checking all
11 critical speech and actions.

12 "6. By emphasizing (T.N. the significance of) the
13 GREAT EAST ASIA Conference and the Joint Declaration
14 of GREAT EAST ASIA, and by the process of realization
15 (T.N. of the ideals) thereof, they shall be made to
16 become conscious of a feeling of certainty regarding
17 the construction.

18 "7. In order to check the enemies' counter-
19 propaganda beforehand, they shall be reminded of the
20 past when they groaned for ages in misery under
21 Jewish Oppression under the external appearance of
22 dazzling splendour, by tracing back the history of
23 the atrocities of the U.S.A., BRITAIN and HOLLAND.

24 "8. The co-operation of the CHINESE Residents,
25 HALF-CASTES and ARABS is also worthy of attention."

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1 "It shall be emphasized that these people, too, while
2 basking in the new glory similar to the INDONESIANS,
3 must, together with the latter, exert themselves
4 towards the construction of a new society; and the
5 policy of concord of all the peoples with the INDO-
6 NESIAN Race as the nucleus shall be adhered to.

7 "9. The new policy shall be glorified by
8 utilizing the actual results and the present con-
9 dition of the co-operation of the people, the policy
10 of the organization of the Volunteer Defence Corps
11 and the participation in the Government as the
12 background.

13 "Measures.

14 "1. Every kind of information-organization and
15 primitive method shall be utilized.

16 "2. Newspapers shall issue extra-bulletins;
17 there shall be no suspension of publication on
18 Sundays; and on the first and second days four page
19 newspapers shall be issued.

20 "3. As for movies, the functions during a week
21 after the official announcement shall be filmed and
22 edited, by also taking into consideration the effects
23 in foreign countries.

24 "4. In the broadcasting the text of the official
25 announcement in TOKYO, the statement of the Commander-

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1 in-Chief and the talks of the Authorities of the
2 Military Administration, etc., shall be repeated,
3 accompanied by clear and cheerful music. Moreover,
4 the inspiration and the determination of the native
5 inhabitants shall be put in the daily programmes.

6 "5. The national flag of Great JAPAN shall be
7 hoisted for one week from the day of the Official
8 Announcement.

9 "6. The details of this Outline shall be planned
10 and executed by the Department of Propaganda in co-
11 operation with the Bureau of Native Affairs.

12 "To be distributed for office-purposes to:

13 "Department of Propaganda (including news corres-
14 pondents),

15 "Bureau of Native Affairs,

16 "Bureau of Japanese Affairs."
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1 "The promise made on 7 September 1944 by
2 Premier KOISO was announced in Java by the Commander-
3 in-Chief in the following words:

4 "As for the nation that will be set up in
5 the future it would be a just and true nation that
6 will become a link in the Greater East Asiatic Co-
7 prosperity Sphere and has the duty to contribute to
8 the development of Greater East Asia under the leader-
9 ship of Dai Nippon.

10 "Therefore, if all inhabitants like to raise
11 the standard of the nation that will be set up so that
12 it would become one of the Greater East Asiatic nations
13 in the true sense, then it is very necessary that they
14 train themselves ceaselessly to become a Greater East
15 Asiatic people until the final victory is achieved,
16 i.e., by thoroughly convincing themselves as a Greater
17 East Asiatic people.

18 "Suppose the final victory will not be won,
19 then the construction of Greater East Asia can not be
20 materialized, and as a matter of course, the East Indies
21 will not get their independence.

22 "Therefore, all inhabitants must exert all
23 their efforts to win the final victory in a sphere
24 of perfect friendship between all nationalities.

25 "They must patiently endure all hardships and
they also must remove all obstacles that might come

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1 up in the future.

2 "And, therefore, while waiting for the ar-
3 rival of the amount of that glorious independence, all
4 the inhabitants must work hard for the continuance of
5 this war. With such an attitude the duties for the
6 future can be fulfilled."

7 "The 'gratitude' of the Indonesians for
8 KOISO's promise remained the theme on which the Japanese
9 propaganda continued to play for months to come.

10 "At the same time, 16th Army Headquarters
11 were instructed to advise the Ministry of War as to
12 what area should be declared 'independent' the date on
13 which it was to take place, and the form of the new
14 Government and state.

15 "The Military Government of Java in reply
16 submitted a report entitled 'Gist of Measures for
17 Guiding Independence', in which it was proposed to
18 make Java independent first. Measures suggested to
19 strengthen the national consciousness were the creation
20 of the Ken Koku Gakuin (Academy for the Building of
21 the State), and increased participation in the admin-
22 istration.

23 "Only two practical steps were taken at first
24 to carry out KOISO's promise. On 8 September 1944
25 the population was allowed henceforth to fly the

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1 Indonesian alongside the Japanese flag but
2 only on certain specified holidays, subject to strict
3 regulations as to place and size. On Government build-
4 ings of the Administration the Japanese flag only was
5 to be flown. On that same date permission was given
6 to sing the 'Indonesia Raya'-song (Song of Great In-
7 donesia) as the national anthem.

8 "On 11 September 1944 the Commander-in-Chief
9 convoked a special session of the Tyuuko Sangi-In
10 (Central Advisory Council), in order to answer the
11 question of how the Indonesians could show to Japan
12 and her arm their intense gratitude for the promise of
13 future independence, and how the will of the people 'to
14 fight to bring about the destruction of America and
15 England could still further be enhanced.'

16 "Another extraordinary session of the Tyuuko
17 Sangi-In was held on 17 November 1944, and a motion
18 was adopted to lay down a so-called 'Pancha Dharma'
19 (Five Rules for the Conduct of Life) as a 'compass'
20 for the Indonesian population.

21 "This 'Pancha-Dharma' reads as follows:

22 ""For the Indonesian People, to wit:

23 "1. We, along with other nations in Greater
24 East Asia, are in this war one in life and death with
25 Dai Nippon, and will contribute our efforts in all

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1 sincerity because this present war stands up for jus-
2 tice and righteousness.

3 "12. We found an Indonesian State that is
4 independent, unified, sovereign, just, and prosperous
5 and that always will value the spiritual merits of
6 Dai Nippon, and that will live as a true member in the
7 family-sphere of Greater East Asia.

8 "13. We will sincerely endeavor to achieve
9 a glorious greatness by way of keeping up and elevating
10 our own civilization and culture, by helping to develop
11 the Asiatic culture and by beautifying the world's
12 culture.

13 "14. While maintaining strong and lasting
14 friendly relations with the nations of Greater East
15 Asia, we serve our country and people with all our heart
16 and with an unwavering mind while we will always be-
17 lieve in God Almighty.

18 "15. With a united and burning desire we
19 strive for the achievement of an ever-lasting World
20 Peace based on the family-conception of the whole man-
21 kind according to the principle of Hakko Ichiu.'

22 "On 1 December 1944 participation in the Ad-
23 ministration was extended to the appointment of Indo-
24 nesean 'HukuOSyuutyokan' (Vice Governors) in several
25 Syuu, and of more Indonesian Sanyo (Advisers) to the

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1 various Departments of the Gunsoikanbu. A Sanyo-
2 Kaigi (Board of San-yo) was established to meet re-
3 gularly to advise the Gunsoikanbu in the periods of
4 when the Tyuuoo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was
5 not in session.

6 "Meanwhile the propaganda service had intro-
7 duced a new slogan for the 'Benteng Forjuangan Jawa'
8 (Java One Fortress). The object was to bring the popu-
9 lation to the maximum war effort in view of the threat
10 of an Allied landing, now openly anticipated. Air
11 Raid Defense and Fire Brigade drills were daily routine
12 but besides, the population was worked upon by the
13 powerful propaganda machinery and trained in guerilla
14 fighting. They were instructed in the methods of
15 destroying small enemy formations with primitive
16 weapons (bamboo spears hardened in fire) and by mass
17 action.

18 "During a propaganda meeting in Batavia ef-
19 figies of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Van der Plas (a
20 prominent Dutch administrator) were burned after having
21 been paraded through the whole town. American, British,
22 and Dutch flags were painted on the roads and trampled
23 upon by processions during a propaganda demonstration.
24 Religious propaganda urged the Mohammedans to declare
25 Holy War on the Occidental Powers."

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1 "Three new semi-military organizations were
2 established during this period, and the Tonari Gumi,
3 finally, were used as a reinforcement for the Keiboo-
4 daain the defense of the village. On no occasions
5 were these simple villagers ever told that such action
6 on their part in war time would constitute a violation
7 of the Rules of Land Warfare and would force the op-
8 posing party to treat them as 'franc tireurs'.

9 "This training had an unintended result. One
10 night in February 1945, a detachment of the Volunteer
11 Defense Corps at Blitar (East Java) made a surprise
12 attack on the Japanese guarding the armory, captured
13 the arms as well as key-points in the town, for instance,
14 Kompei HQ, the Telegraph and Telephone Exchange etc.
15 Subsequently, an orgy of murder and robbery ensued,
16 the victims being all non-Indonesians and included
17 Japanese. In the course of the next days the movement
18 was partly settled by compromise, partly stamped out
19 by violence and bloodshed.

20 "There was also increasing resistance against
21 Japanese regulations in the economic field, especially
22 against the delivery of agricultural produce and the
23 recruiting of native labor.

24 "In order to overcome this resistance, strong
25 measures were adopted against Indonesian civilian

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1 officials who were held responsible for the poor re-
2 sults in recruiting. Many were dismissed and substi-
3 tuted by nationalist and occasionally by Islamite poli-
4 ticians. These new officials had come to the fore
5 through the Java Hookoo Kai, or through the religious
6 courses. The new arrivals in the Indenosean adminis-
7 trative corps were not fully competent, and they always
8 had Japanese advisers. Approximately one-third of the
9 corps was staffed with nationalists favourably dis-
10 posed towards the Japanese. Required delivery of
11 foodstuff and recruitment of coolies and volunteers
12 were not achieved by many Ken.

13 "The Japanese realized that they were in-
14 creasingly dependent upon the co-operation of the people
15 and that they would have to bear the consequences of
16 their own propaganda.

17 "In September 1942 already, Count Hideo
18 Kodama, then adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of Java
19 visited Tokyo to try to arouse interest in local views
20 concerning the East Indies. In November 1943 Sukarno
21 was sent to Japan and pressed Premier TOJO to grant
22 independence, but obtained no definite answer. At the
23 end of 1944, HAYASHI, the then highest civil adviser
24 to the Java Military Government went to Tokyo with the
25 consent of the Commander-in-Chief in Java to try to

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1 persuade Japan to support puppet-independence for the
2 East Indies.

3 "A Ken Koku Gokuin (Academy for the Building
4 of the State) was instituted on 29 April 1945 with the
5 object of influencing the minds of the future 'leaders'
6 of the 'independent' state and of imbuing them with
7 ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
8 led by Japan, and with a correct conception of this
9 leadership.

10 "Meanwhile, Java Headquarters pressed higher
11 authorities for a speedy solution. On 30 April 1945,
12 a conference took place at Singapore, attended by
13 Chiefs of General Affairs Departments of all areas
14 under the command of the 7th Area Army, comprising
15 Java and Sumatra and commanded by ITAGAKI. At this
16 conference the Soomubutyoo of Java explained to what
17 extent the national consciousness of the Indonesians
18 had now been fully awakened and emphasized the fact
19 that there was no other way to regain the confidence
20 of the population but by carrying out the promise of
21 independence.

22 "Field Marshal TERAUCHI's Headquarters at
23 Saigon on 15 May 1945 requested views of local Head-
24 quarters on 'independence'. Java promptly responded
25 with a proposition to declare the whole of the Nether-

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1 lands East Indies independent within a year. Singapore
2 dodged the issue and said that it was not yet time to
3 initiate independence.

4 "Subsequently, on 20 May 1945, at the insti-
5 gation of ITAGAKI, a meeting was called of all Chiefs
6 of Staff at Singapore. The conference recognized that
7 the war was turning against Japan. Java was allowed
8 to convene a 'Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin' (Committee
9 for the Study of Preparations for Independence). This com-
10 mittee was installed on 28 May 1945 and took a solemn
11 oath of loyalty to live and to die with Japan."
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1 "'Naval' territories (Borneo, the Celebes,
2 the Lesser Sunda Isles, etc.) were not represented
3 at this conference, and measures discussed only
4 related to 'Army' areas which narrowed down to
5 Java. In Sumatra, political developments lagged
6 behind that of Java, and it was not until February
7 1945 that a Central Advisory Council for Sumatra
8 was installed.

9 "The Committee for the Study of Preparations
10 for Independence consisted of approximately 60 mem-
11 bers, including four Chinese, one Indo-Arab and one
12 Eurasian. A Japanese was Deputy Chairman, and
13 seven others were 'special members.' The Committee
14 had an Administrative Bureau with a Japanese Deputy
15 Chief.

16 "The Ordinance founding this Committee
17 required that its findings had to be reported to
18 the Gunseikan. Later, a new 'Committee for the
19 Preparation of Independence' would be formed. It
20 was clearly stipulated that the 'Committee for Study'
21 was to confine itself to study and was not empowered
22 to make any decision.

23 "The Committee met twice, from 22 May to
24 2 June and from 10 to 16 July 1945. These meetings
25 were not open to the public. Among other things, a

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1 constitution resembling that of the Philippine
2 puppet-state was drafted.

3 "There was disappointment when it was
4 learned that the Committee had no power to make
5 decisions and had to restrict itself to Java.

6 "On 17 July 1945, the Supreme War Direction
7 Council decided to adopt the policy of granting
8 'independence' to the East Indies as soon as pos-
9 sible. (Prosecution document No. 2759, Court exhibit
10 No. 1350).

11 "This decision reached Java on 21 July
12 1945. According to directives from Tokyo, the
13 territory of the new state was to comprise the
14 whole of the Netherlands East Indies, while a
15 'Committee for the Preparation for Independence'
16 was to be set up in the near future.

17 "Emphasis was laid upon the necessity for
18 safeguarding the requirements for military operations.
19 The Headquarters of the Southern Army at Saigon,
20 which had submitted in June 1945 that the establish-
21 ment of the puppet-state should not take place before
22 the middle of 1946, and that the above-named Committee
23 should at the earliest be set up towards the end of
24 1945, was ordered to work out the details.

25 "Consequently, on 30 July 1945 at ITAGAKI's

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1 Headquarters in Singapore a conference was held
2 of the Soomubutyoo (Heads of General Affairs
3 Departments of the Gunseikanbu) of the regions
4 concerned. At this Conference a scheme was drawn
5 up for guiding preparations for so-called independence,
6 wherein the date was set for the spring of 1946.

7 "THE FIFTH PHASE

8 "August-September 1945.

9 "In the beginning of August 1945, Field
10 Marshal TERAUCHI received telegraphic orders from
11 Tokyo to hasten preparations for the Indonesian
12 puppet-state as much as possible, and to create
13 this state in September 1945. In pursuance of this
14 order, on 7 August 1945 TERAUCHI decreed the estab-
15 lishment of the Dokuritsu Junbi Iin (Committee for
16 the Preparation for Independence).

17 "This was effected by proclamation of the
18 same date, reading as follows:

19 "'Proclamation of the Nanpoo-Gun (Japanese
20 Southern Army).

21 "'Concerning the 'Committee for the Prepara-
22 tion for Independence of Indonesia.'

23 "'Based on the proclamation of the Japanese
24 Government of 7 September last year, the Nanpoo-Gun
25 has consistently been taking measures to guide the

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1 Indonesians. Owing to the spiritual awakening of
2 the people up to this moment, they have all succeeded
3 in achieving much and fast progress in their train-
4 ing for government and for the defense of the country
5 with burning enthusiasm.

6 "In response to the activity and the whole-
7 hearted efforts of the people, the Nanpoo-Gun
8 expresses its approval of the installation towards
9 the middle of August of a Committee for the Prepara-
10 tion for Independence of Indonesia; that Committee
11 shall accelerate all measures concerning the final
12 preparations for the installation of the Government
13 of an independent Indonesia.

14 "12 o'clock, 7. VIII. 1945."

15 "On the same day on which the proclamation
16 of Marshal TERAUCHI was published in Java, the
17 Saikoo Sikikan (Commander-in-Chief) of Java also
18 issued a proclamation, wherein, inter alia, it was
19 stated:

20 "The desire to become an independent
21 nation has now reached a high point and is flaring up
22 all over Indonesia. It was in response to the ex-
23 pression of this desire that the Dai Nippon Teikoku
24 solemnly promised to grant her independence, in
25 accordance with the basic principle of the

1 Dai Nippon Teikoku, (Japanese Empire), i.e., the
2 ideals of Hakko Ichiu. Since that promise the whole
3 population has exerted itself to its utmost to honor
4 the national obligations and the stronger became
5 their determination to bring the war to a success-
6 ful conclusion, so that the foundations for their
7 independence could be built up fully and speedily.
8 And now, as an independent nation, constituting a
9 link in the chain of the Co-Prosperity Sphere of
10 Greater East Asia, she will join and take her place
11 in the battle-line for the common defense of Greater
12 East Asia.'

13 "The Gunseikan, (Chief Military Government)
14 on this occasion stated the following:

15 "The independence of Indonesia as a
16 member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East
17 Asia, is based upon humanitarian principles so as to
18 contribute in the formation of a new world order.
19 Therefore, the lofty ideals of the Indonesians and
20 their intense enthusiasm conform with the basic
21 ideals of the Dai Nippon Teikoku, i.e. the spirit
22 of Hakko Ichiu.

23 "A new nation will have to meet some
24 essential requirements: it must have sufficient
25 strength, while its administrative machinery should

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1 be organized in a smooth and simple way. Therefore,
2 the first duty is to bring the war now being faced
3 by the Indonesians to a successful conclusion. To
4 this end the Indonesian nation must develop its
5 war potential to its full extent, and together with
6 Dai Nippon fight unceasingly to achieve final victory
7 in this Greater East Asia War.'

8 "A few days of silence on the subject of
9 independence followed; Japanese propaganda continued
10 to elaborate upon the common ties of destiny between
11 Japan and Indonesia: 'To live or die with Japan.'

12 "Meanwhile on 9 August 1945, a delegation
13 of three leading Indonesian nationalists, including
14 Sukarno, was flown to TERAUCHI's Headquarters at
15 Saigon, and received by the Field Marshal on 11
16 August. They were told by the latter that it was
17 originally intended to send the delegation to Tokyo
18 to receive the Imperial Decree direct from the Japanese
19 Government. On account of difficulties and dangers
20 of communications and pressure of time, the Field
21 Marshal had been instructed to transmit the contents
22 of the Decree to the delegation on behalf of the
23 Imperial Government.

24 "The main points were:

25 "a. The Japanese Government had been pleased

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1 to institute a Committee for the Preparation for
2 Independence.

3 "b. The territory of the New State would
4 include the entire Netherlands East Indies.

5 "c. The date when independence would be
6 proclaimed in any territory was to be determined at
7 the discretion of the Imperial Government, as soon
8 as preparations were completed.

9 "d. The independent Government would be
10 installed first in the island where preparations
11 had been first completed. Subsequently this Govern-
12 ment would be gradually extended to include areas
13 where preparations had been completed.

14 "e. All Japanese demands in connection
15 with the military situation were to be complied with.

16 "f. Sukarno was appointed Chairman of the
17 Committee, which further consisted of thirteen
18 representatives from Java, three from Sumatra and
19 five from territories under naval occupation. Those
20 members were appointed on nomination by local Japan-
21 ese military commanders.

22 "On 14 August 1945 the newspapers in Java
23 reported the news of Sukarno's return, and he was
24 welcomed as the new leader of Indonesia by the
25 Commander-in-Chief and many of the military and

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Indonesian authorities. Meanwhile the Committee

1 members from Sumatra, Borneo, the Celebes, and Bali,
2 whose names were now published, were flown to Java,
3 after having received their instructions from the
4 military or naval authorities of those areas.

5 "Originally the first meeting of the
6 Committee was fixed for 19 August.

7 "On 15 August, however, members of the
8 Committee were secretly informed of Japan's capitu-
9 lation.

10 "During the night of 16 to 17 August 1945,
11 the Committee, augmented by nationalists and youth
12 leaders, prominent during that period, met at the
13 residence of the Japanese Naval Liaison Officer
14 MAEDA. Sukarno had, prior to this meeting, conferred
15 with the Soemubutyoo (Chief General Affairs Department)
16 and MAEDA. It was decided to proclaim independence
17 the next morning.

18 "The constitution drafted by the Dokuritsu
19 Chosa Junbi Iin (the Committee set up in May for
20 the Study of Preparations for Independence) was
21 hastily altered, and on the following morning the
22 Independence was broadcast by Sukarno through a
23 microphone, installed by the Japanese propaganda
24 service on the veranda of his house."
25

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1 "The population of Java was still un-
2 informed, except through rumor, about the capitula-
3 tion of Japan. Radio receiving sets had been un-
4 fitted to pick up foreign broadcasts, even from
5 Tokyo. On instructions from the Commander-in-Chief,
6 the Japanese propaganda service kept Japan's defeat
7 secret.

8 "The newspapers, controlled by the Japanese
9 propaganda service, and the local broadcasting
10 stations between 17 and 21 August 1945 made no
11 mention of anything but the announcement of indepen-
12 dence and the proclamation of the constitution.

13 "On 21 August 1945, the papers published,
14 next to the text of the Emperor's broadcast of 14
15 August on the surrender, a proclamation by the
16 Commander-in-Chief of Java, containing, inter alia,
17 the following words:

18 "'Dai Nippon is and will always be a
19 friend to Indonesia, immutably and forever. We
20 never will forget our oath; united in life and in
21 death.'

22 "Until 21 August 1945 the Japanese author-
23 ities had kept Japan's defeat secret; this period has
24 been called the 'stolen week.'"
25

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1 This concludes the direct testimony of this
2 witness. With the Court's permission he may be
3 cross-examined.

4 THE PRESIDENT: It has been a pleasure to
5 listen to you, Mrs. Strooker.

6 MRS. STROOKER: Thank you, your Honor.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.
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CROSS-EXAMINATION

1 BY MR. LOGAN:

2 Q Major, on page three of your affidavit
3 you state that after the Japanese troops entered the
4 Netherlands Indies they interned a group of influential
5 persons in the administration of the country's affairs.
6 Isn't that a usual procedure done by an Army of
7 Occupation?
8

9 A My report is based upon investigations in
10 the Netherlands East Indies and upon large scale
11 investigation in other -- I do not know whether in
12 other countries during the occupation similar measures
13 have been taken. My report is -- restricts itself
14 to the Netherlands East Indies.

15 Q Well, may I ask you this, Major: As an
16 army man wouldn't you say that that was proper procedure
17 for an Army of Occupation?

18 A The point is that not only prominent sections
19 of the Occidental population have been interned, but
20 practically the whole white population; and that I think
21 is unusual.

22 JAPANESE INTERPRETER: Owing to the fact that
23 simultaneous translation can not be done, translation
24 will be done according to the relay system.

25 THE NETHERLANDS INTERPRETER: The witness' answer:

1 "Not only prominent sections of the population had
2 been interned, but practically the whole white population
3 of these islands and that I think is unusual in
4 occupied territory."

5 Q The internment of these people, Major,
6 was basically a security and control measure by the
7 Japanese occupational forces, isn't that so?

8 A This was not only a security measure. I
9 think that it is evident from documents introduced in
10 this Court during these days; but it was obviously
11 the deliberate intention on the part of the Japanese
12 to eradicate Western influences.

13 Q Now, Major, I am not interested in conclusions.
14 I would appreciate it if you would confine yourself
15 to answering the questions, if you mind.

16 A The facts are these: That document issued
17 by the Japanese Government and studied by me indicate
18 that --

19 Q Well, Major, what I am interested in knowing
20 is whether or not these measures of internment which
21 were taken by the Japanese occupational forces were
22 basically security and control measures?

23 A Confining myself -- restricting myself to
24 facts, I have to state that in no document I found
25 any indication of anything but that this internment

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1 was solely a security measure.

2 Q Perhaps you didn't understand me, Major. I
3 am asking you as an army man, from your experience,
4 isn't it proper for the occupational forces to take
5 basic security and control measures by interning
6 those people in control of the country which is occupied?

7 MR. HYDE: Mr. President, I object to this
8 question. It is calling for a conclusion. The Major
9 has testified as to things that he saw. He has made
10 a report as the document indicates. He is now being
11 asked to give testimony, conclusive testimony, opinion
12 testimony as an army officer. It is improper cross-
13 examination, I submit.

14 THE PRESIDENT: All your questions are
15 questions for the Court, Mr. Logan. We know that in-
16 vading armies do take security measures, but never by
17 interning on a wholesale scale such as he testifies to.
18

19 If you ask him whether in fact the internment
20 of any Javanese was called for by the facts of the
21 case, I will permit him to answer. It would be better
22 to ask him what was the conduct of the Javanese prior
23 to the internments.

24 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, he stated
25 facts in his affidavit here and we must assume, naturally,
that he is claiming what was done was wrong.

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14 THE PRESIDENT: All your questions are questions
15 for the Court, Mr. Logan. We know that invading
16 armies do take security measures, but never by interning
17 on a wholesale scale such as he testifies to.

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19 of any Japanese was called for by the facts of the
20 case, I will permit him to answer. It would be better
21 to ask him what was the conduct of the Japanese prior
22 to the internments.

23 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, he stated
24 facts in his affidavit here and we must assume, naturally,
25 that he is claiming what was done was wrong.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: If you suggest to him
2 that the conduct of the Javanese warranted their
3 internment he may answer. That is a question of fact.

4 The objection is upheld.

5 BY MR. LOGAN (Continued):

6 Q How many people, Major, are there in the
7 Netherlands East Indies?

8 A The population is approximately 70,000,000.

9 Q How many of them born were Occidentals born
10 in the Netherlands Indies?

11 A Before the war the situation was that there
12 were 250,000 Occidentals, the majority of which were
13 born in these islands.
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1 THE PRESIDENT: If you suggest to him
2 that the conduct of the Japanese warranted their
3 internment he may answer. That is a question of fact.

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5 BY MR. LOGAN (Continued):

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1 Q And how many of those 250,000 lived in Java?

2 A I have no exact information, but it can be
3 assumed that the majority of these 250,000 lived in
4 Java.

5 Q And out of that 250,000, or slightly less
6 than that in Java, only 62,000 were interned; is
7 that right?

8 A That is not entirely correct. It has to be
9 borne in mind that apart from these 60,000 civilian
10 internees there was a number of 45,000 military per-
11 sonnel also interned as prisoners of war.

12 Q Well, would you say including that 45,000
13 there were about 100,000 in Java interned?

14 A That is correct.

15 Q Then that would leave about 100,000, slightly
16 more than 100,000, who were not interned; is that
17 correct?

18 A That is correct.

19 Q Is this statement correct on page 3 of
20 your affidavit, that by the end of 1943 it may be
21 said that all Occidentals not born in the Netherlands
22 Indies, both male and female, had been interned with
23 a few exceptions, men and women above 65 or 70 years
24 of age?

25 A That is perfectly correct.

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1 Q Do I understand that about 100,000 of the
2 people of Java were over 65 or 70 years of age?

3 A That would be entirely incorrect, because
4 we are dealing here with Occidentals not born in
5 the Indies.

6 Q Wasn't that what you were talking about in
7 your affidavit, and what we have been talking about
8 here?

9 A The question put to me was, what was the
10 Occidental population of the Netherlands East Indies.
11 I included the Occidentals born in these islands as
12 well as outside the islands.

13 Q Am I correct in saying that there were only
14 about 50,000 full-blooded Dutch in all the East Indies?

15 A I am not entirely clear about the meaning of
16 the question. Do you mean to say whether before the
17 war there were no more than 50,000 Occidentals of
18 pure Dutch extraction in the islands?

19 Q Yes.

20 A I wish to stress that these figures are not
21 part of my investigations; also, I have no information --
22 no correct information now, but I do think that the
23 figures are somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000.

24 Q Then there were about 150,000 Eurasians,
25 is that correct?

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1 A That should be approximately correct.

2 Q You also state in your affidavit, Major,
3 that when the Japanese occupational forces came in
4 all the bank balances were immediately frozen. Isn't
5 that the usual procedure for an Army of Occupation to
6 follow?

7 MR. HYDE: Mr. President, again I submit
8 that the testimony of this witness is a report of
9 what he saw. He does not purport to indicate in
10 there whether it was usual or unusual. I submit
11 that it is improper cross-examination.

12 THE PRESIDENT: The question invades our
13 province. It is for us to say what are the powers
14 and authorities of an invading army under public
15 international law. It is for the witness to state
16 the facts to which that law might be applied. Even
17 if the Major were an authority on public international
18 law, we still would have to decide questions of law.

19 MR. LOGAN: May I be heard on that, your
20 Honor, please?

21 THE PRESIDENT: Public international law
22 is no longer a question of fact for an international
23 body like this, which is here to apply public inter-
24 national law.

25 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, we have

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1 a witness here who has set forth a number of acts,
2 which he states were done by the Japanese Army.
3 There are several ways in which we can cross-examine
4 this witness on those acts. One is by inquiring of
5 him whether or not this was the usual method which
6 was adopted by any invading army.

7 THE PRESIDENT: The powers of an invading
8 army are determined by public international law,
9 which we alone decide. You may examine him as to
10 the facts with a view to our applying the public
11 international law. If in his statement he has ex-
12 pressed any views about those matters we will disre-
13 gard what he says. I told you in Chambers that we
14 were going to take from this witness only answers of
15 fact, and not expressions of opinion or conclusions.

16 MR. LOGAN: I am examining him, your Honor,
17 only on statements of fact which he has made in his
18 affidavit.

19 THE PRESIDENT: You may ask him whether the
20 facts were not such as to warrant what the Japanese
21 Army did in any particular case. Even that may be
22 too much. It may be that all you can ask him is
23 what were the facts which preceded the Japanese ac-
24 tion.

25 MR. LOGAN: By asking him, your Honor, as

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1 you suggest, as to whether or not the facts warranted
2 that would be asking his opinion. That is just what
3 I wanted to avoid doing.

4 THE PRESIDENT: I said that might be too
5 much, and I went on to say you can ask him what was
6 the conduct of the Javanese before the Japanese
7 interned them.

8 You can review your proposed cross-exami-
9 nation during the recess, Mr. Logan.

10 We will recess for fifteen minutes.

11 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was
12 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings
13 were resumed as follows:)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

4 BY MR. LOGAN (Continued):

5 Q Major, what bank balances were frozen?

6 A All bank balances.

7 Q And if these bank balances hadn't been
8 frozen, I suppose the Dutch could have used the money
9 and withdrawn from the bank and bought ammunition,
10 perhaps, or some other articles which would have
11 endangered the success of the Occupation, isn't
12 that so?

13 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan, as I am reminded
14 by a colleague, this is really argument with the wit-
15 ness and not cross-examination.

16 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal pleases, it is
17 my understanding from the statement before the
18 recess that we could inquire into what acts of
19 the Javanese could possibly have brought about the
20 things that were done by the Japanese.

21 THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the witness,
22 did the Javanese borrow money from the banks to buy
23 arms to use against the Japanese?

24 MR. LOGAN: I do not see where that would
25 be very helpful, if the Tribunal pleases, because

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1 the witness has stated in his affidavit that these
2 bank balances were immediately frozen. I want to
3 know what is wrong with it. In other words, this
4 witness has testified to all these acts; and, in-
5 stead of setting forth in his affidavit what was
6 wrong with these, to try to point out to the Tribunal
7 where it was illegal, perhaps, for the Japanese to
8 have done what they have done. All he does here
9 in his affidavit is set forth the bare facts. I
10 want to find out what was wrong with them.

11 THE PRESIDENT: In other words, you are
12 asking the witness to judge the Japanese. We will
13 do that.

14 MR. LOGAN: No. I am not asking that, if
15 the Tribunal please. My point is that all these --
16 instead of the prosecution setting forth these acts
17 and showing where they were wrong, which the burden
18 is on them to do, they merely set forth the acts;
19 and I am trying to find out from the witness what he
20 claims is wrong with it.

21 THE PRESIDENT: In other words, you want
22 to argue with him.

23 MR. LOGAN: No, I do not want to argue with
24 him, your Honor.

25 THE PRESIDENT: You cannot ask him any

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1 question which involves a judgment by him of whether
2 the Japanese were right or wrong in what they did.

3 BY MR. LOGAN (Continued):

4 Q You state in your affidavit, Major, that
5 the Javanese were prohibited from using their
6 radio. If that restriction had not been placed,
7 would it not have been possible for the people there
8 to endanger the success of the Occupation?

9 THE PRESIDENT: We know that occupying
10 forces, to feel secure, must exercise some super-
11 vision over the use of the radio and other means of
12 communication. Why ask him? We could tell him.

13 MR. LOGAN: Then, may I take it it is the
14 Tribunal's position that the Japanese Occupation
15 force were within their rights in turning these
16 people in administration and banning the use of
17 radio and burning books and abolishing certain coun-
18 cils as in accordance with international law?

19 THE PRESIDENT: That is a testy observation,
20 not justified by anything said by me. The question
21 is whether the Japanese were justified in doing
22 what they did. That will be ascertained by getting
23 from this witness the facts of the particular case
24 and letting us weigh them up in the light of the
25 law.

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1 BY MR. LOGAN (Continued):

2 Q Do you know, Major, if any of the Javanese
3 people used their radios to get in communication
4 with the Dutch government?

5 A Attempts have been made on a few occasions
6 to get into touch with the Netherlands Government
7 through transmitters, not wireless receiving sets,
8 which were mentioned in the statement.

9 THE PRESIDENT: I will place no limit on
10 you in getting from this witness, if you can, facts
11 as to the behaviour of the Javanese which would tend
12 to show the Japanese took only necessary measures
13 of security, but they must be facts, not opinions.

14 Q Then, Major, would you say it was necessary
15 in order to prevent espionage and sabotage that the
16 radios be sealed?

17 MR. HYDE: Mr. President, I respectfully
18 suggest that that question also calls for his opinion.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Objection upheld.

20 Q Was any such use made of the radios to make
21 it necessary to do this?

22 A Cases which I know of where transmitters
23 have been used to contact the Netherlands Government
24 occurred in the course of 1943, while receiving sets
25 had been sealed as far back as April '42. That is

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1 one year and six months before these cases occurred.

2 Q With respect to these books that were burned,
3 did any of them contain any anti-Japanese sentiments?

4 A Naturally one of the first categories of
5 books to be burned were those which contained anti-
6 Japanese sentiments.

7 Q Were the councils which were in existence
8 at the time Japanese occupied the Netherlands East
9 Indies -- were their sympathies anti-Japanese?

10 A In answer to this question, a direct answer
11 I can not give; I can only say that these councils
12 were made up of representatives of all the various
13 communities in Java, in the Indies, and it is possi-
14 ble or probable that among them there were those
15 who had anti-Japanese sentiments.

16 Q Was there any restriction in these councils
17 with respect to the representation of the Javanese
18 people on them?

19 A As far as I know, there was no restriction
20 on the grounds of racial descent, so that all
21 Javanese could be representatives on these councils.

22 Q When the law courts were abolished a new
23 system was set up by the Japanese, isn't that so?

24 A The witness' answer is, "That is correct."

25 Q And these new law courts administered crim-

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1 inal and civil law in the Netherlands East Indies?

2 A That is correct.

3 Q It was merely a substitution of one system
4 for another, isn't that so?

5 A I have only pointed out that old courts
6 were abolished and new courts were instituted.

7 Q Were there any riots or disorders amongst
8 the Javanese people which required a regulation
9 that they could not meet in groups except under
10 police supervision?

11 A Indeed, when the Japanese forces entered
12 Java robbery by gangs have occurred. Raiding
13 parties and gang robberies have occurred.

14 Q So that it was necessary to enforce such
15 regulations, is that so?

16 A It is not clear to me what the advantages
17 were of instituting new courts in this connection.

18 Q I am not speaking about courts, Major, I am
19 talking about meetings of various associations
20 under police supervision.

21 A To my mind, it must have been desirable at
22 the beginning, at the outset, to prohibit gatherings
23 and associations. I wish to point out, however, that
24 when I say associations I meant gatherings, the
25 ganging together of people, but I do not include the

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1 prohibition of associations.

2 Q Prior to the occupation -- Have you finished
3 your answer?

4 A Yes, answer finished.

5 Q You understand English, don't you, Major?

6 A I do understand English.

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1 Q Prior to the Occupation, Major, were the pub-
2 lic radio broadcasts and moving picture activities
3 controlled by the government?

4 A Before the war broadcasts, public broadcasts,
5 were handled by the NIROM, which was a private con-
6 cern but which was bound by regulations laid down
7 by the government.

8 Q And were anti-Japanese sentiments broadcast
9 over these radios up to the time of Occupation, perhaps
10 two months thereafter?

11 A As and since the Netherlands East Indies
12 were at war with Japan, there is no doubt that some
13 anti-Japanese broadcasts have been made after the out-
14 break of war and before the occupation.

15 Q Is that same thing true with respect to moving
16 pictures and the newspapers?

17 A Naturally in the newspapers, as well, anti-
18 Japanese sentiments have been expressed. As far as
19 films, cinematographical films, are concerned, the
20 film industry in Java was backward and I do not know of
21 any pictures having been made which expressed anti-
22 Japanese sentiments.

23 Q Were the radio and newspapers used for this
24 purpose for about two months after the Occupation?

25 A The answer is no. Newspapers, films, and

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1 radio broadcasts came immediately under Japanese con-
2 trol and what I have seen of papers and what I have
3 heard over the radio contained nothing which I thought
4 could give any offense to the Japanese, which would
5 lead to restrictive measures.

6 Q What is the literacy in the Netherlands East
7 Indies? Am I correct in saying it is about seven per
8 cent?

9 A Literacy -- the correct figures about literacy
10 in the Netherlands East Indies are not known to me.
11 I think it is possibly slightly more than seven per
12 cent. I think it is approximately ten per cent, and
13 the ten per cent refers to the whole population of
14 the Netherlands East Indies, to all of the seventy
15 million people.

16 Q How soon after the Japanese Occupation were
17 the schools closed?

18 A The same day of the Occupation.

19 Q When were they reopened?

20 A The Indonesian primary schools were reopened
21 after the Emperor's birthday on the 29th of April.
22 They were reopened with a provisional curriculum.
23 This all refers to those schools that were not used
24 for billets or otherwise occupied by the Japanese Army.
25 It was not until August, 1942, that all Indonesian

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1 primary schools were reopened with the new curriculum.

2 Q And did they continue to teach the same
3 subjects with the addition of certain courses in the
4 Japanese language, Japanese songs and dances?

5 A As I pointed out in my statement, subjects
6 such as general history -- such subjects as general
7 history were dropped and other subjects were generally --
8 other subjects of a non-political nature were main-
9 tained but they suffered from the introduction of
10 Japanese language, Japanese dances, music, etc.,
11 into the curriculum.

12 Q Were the history courses changed to eliminate
13 any anti-Japanese sentiments that might have appeared
14 in the history courses prior to the Occupation?

15 A General history as a subject was entirely
16 reorganized, reformed, and about anti-Japanese senti-
17 ments which I don't think --

18 Q At the bottom of page 9 of your affidavit
19 you make a statement --

20 THE MONITOR: Mr. Logan, I don't think the
21 witness had finished his statement yet.

22 MR. LOGAN: I am sorry.

23 A (Continuing) It was not merely a question
24 of dropping, or eradicating, occasional anti-Japanese
25 sentiments. The whole subject was reformed, entirely

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1 new general history was introduced giving the purely
2 Japanese view on it.

3 Q I presume the books that were used prior to
4 the Occupation gave the view of history from the Dutch
5 viewpoint, is that so?

6 A Before the war not only was Dutch history
7 taught but also general world history, and I don't
8 believe that there was any particular prejudice in
9 that teaching.

10 Q At the bottom of page 9 of your affidavit,
11 Major, you have a statement to the effect that the
12 basic principles upon which these regions -- I am
13 referring to all the regions in the Netherlands East
14 Indies -- were administered were entirely similar in
15 reality. Do you mean by that civil or militarily
16 administered?

17 A I meant to say in this that administration
18 in the islands outside of Java, as well as administra-
19 tion in Java, was along the same lines laid down in
20 Tokyo.

21 Q I am asking you if you mean civil or military
22 administration.

23 A As I point out later on in my statement, the
24 Netherlands East Indies is divided in various areas,
25 some under the Navy, some under the Army. In both

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1 areas there was a military administration. I mean
2 an administration carried out by officers, service
3 officers, over the civilian population.

4 Q Was the administration conducted by civilians
5 or by military men?

6 A In Java there were three distinct categories
7 of officers. The first category consisted of regular
8 Army officers of whom, for instance, the Gunshikan
9 was one. The second category consisted of civilians
10 who, for the purpose, were given a military rank,
11 while the third category consisted of civilians only.

12 Q Now let us take the teachers. Were they
13 Japanese people or were they natives who taught the
14 schools?

15 A Teachers in primary schools were chiefly
16 Indonesian with only a scattering of Japanese.

17 Q How about the other higher schools of learn-
18 ing?

19 A The same is true for intermediate schools.

20 Q How about colleges, law schools and medical
21 schools?

22 A I have mentioned the situation in the higher --
23 institutions of higher learning where I said that the
24 medical college at Batavia was instructed chiefly by
25 Japanese.

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1 Q Was that the only medical college where
2 Japanese instructors were used?

3 A Under Japanese Occupation there was but one
4 medical college in the whole of the NEI.

5 Q All the other instructors were not Japanese,
6 is that it?

7 A I have stated already that at Batavia Medical
8 College all the professors were Japanese.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Will the defense counsel
10 please restate whether he referred to the one Batavia
11 Medical College or to all medical colleges?

12 MR. LOGAN: Maybe I didn't make myself clear.
13 Maybe I didn't understand you.

14 Q The way I understand it, all the medical
15 colleges had Japanese instructors, or was it just one
16 school that had them?

17 A In the whole of the Netherlands East Indies
18 there was only one medical college and that one was at
19 Batavia.

20 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until
21 half past nine on Monday morning.

22 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment
23 was taken until Monday, 9 December 1946, at
24 0930.)
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